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INTRODUCTION

Finality. To the hopeful appellant before the New York State
Court of Appeals, the word has implications bordering on the awesome. Only rarely does the court hand down a decision list that
does not contain dismissals of appeals for lack of finality. The
court no longer waits for reluctant respondents to suggest, by a
motion, that the putative appeal wants for finality; with careful regard for its jurisdictional limits, the court will dismiss appeals from
non-final determinations sua sponte. Indeed, the court requires an
appellant to justify, by resort to "case, statutory or other authority," the claim that it has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
within 10 days of the time the appeal is taken.1 If an appellant is
not sufficiently persuasive, the court, after inviting further comment from the parties, may dismiss the appeal on its own
initiative.2
To be sure, dismissal on finality grounds does not mean that
*

Law.

B.A., 1972, George Washington University; J.D., 1975, St. John's University School of
RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, § 500.2, [1979] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §500.2. This policy

accords with the principle that the powers conferred by the constitution upon the court of
appeals "may not be enlarged by consent of the parties." Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v. Otis

Elevator Co., 291 N.Y. 254, 255, 52 N.E.2d 421, 421 (1943); see H. COHEN & A.

KARGER,

THE

POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 9 (rev. ed. 1952).
2 RULES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, §500.2, [1979] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. §500.2. For a review of
the procedures followed by the court with respect to sua sponte consideration of jurisdictional issues, see 7 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE, 5601.03a
(1979) [hereinafter cited as WK&M].
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the appellant loses all opportunity to obtain a ruling on the merits
of the appeal from the court of appeals. It does means, however,
that the appeal may be delayed while further proceedings are held
in the courts below s or that an immediate appeal can be taken only
with the permission of the same appellate division that issued the
ruling which aggrieves the appellant.4 An attorney's incorrect belief
on finality can have even more dire consequences. If counsel believes an order is not final and chooses not to appeal it, a later
finding of finality will cost the appellant the appeal if the time to
appeal has expired.
Ever since the concept of finality was first raised to constitutional magnitude in 1894, the distinction between final and nonfinal orders has been a "fruitful source of litigation."' To this day,
finality determinations can involve arcane, if not obscure, distinctions.' The mystery is compounded by the relative scarcity of
readily findable, reported judicial opinions on finality issues." The
majority of finality decisions are not accompanied by explanation;
typically the court provides only a terse statement of the resultY
See N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW. §§ 5601(d), 5602(a)(1)(ii) (McKinney 1978).
" See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(4); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5602(b)(1) (McKinney 1978).
1 See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5611, commentary at 544 (McKinney 1978). Although the
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) provides a safety net to preserve the timeliness of a
second attempt to appeal where the first attempt was made by the wrong method, N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 5514(a) (McKinney 1978), no such grace is afforded where an appeal was foregone in the belief, however sincere, that there was no appellate jurisdiction. Professor Siegel
warns against this possibility in his practice commentary to CPLR 5611: "A dismissed appeal with leave to return at a later time is preferable to to a later ejection with leave to
return at an earlier time, a difficult feat to accomplish in the space-time continuum." N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5611, commentary at 544 (McKinney 1978).
3

6

B.

CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

116 (2d ed. 1909); see, Korn, Civil Jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals and
Appellate Divisions, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 307, 326 (1967).
7 See, e.g., Feinstein v. Bergner, 48 N.Y.2d 234, 237 n.1, 397 N.E.2d 1161, 1162 n.1, 422
N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 n.1 (1979) (order setting aside service of process, standing alone, generally
viewed as non-final, but if order also dismisses complaint, it is deemed final).
' One reason for this scarcity is that most finality questions are resolved on pre-argument motions, and the results of these motions are not digested.
9 The court's workload simply does not allow the luxury of detailed explanations of

preliminary rulings on matters of practice and jurisdiction. As one commentator has noted,

the New York Constitution generally provides for such a mixture of factors to be encountered in court of appeals practice as to cause "innumerable complications, conditions, peculiarities and, finally, pitfalls ... ." N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5601, commentary at 491 (McKinney 1978). At one time in ruling on pre-argument motions to dismiss appeals or in

announcing the outcome of the court's initial sua sponte investigation of a finality question,
the court would issue entries which contained only such bare bones language as "motion to
dismiss appeal denied" or "appeal dismissed on the ground that the order is non-final."
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Appellate counsel, then, have comparatively few published opinions and authorities to employ as guides to assessing or arguing
whether particular determinations are final or non-final.10
This Article is intended to assist the practitioner by reviewing
the history, purpose, and policy of the finality rule in civil appellate practice,11 by explaining the standards employed to resolve
finality questions,1 2 by identifying and discussing particular and
frequently encountered finality problems, 13 and by reviewing the
methods by which final and non-final determinations can be prop14
erly brought to the New York State Court of Appeals for review.
HISTORY, CONSTITUTION AND POLICY

When the court of appeals dismisses an appeal for want of
finality, its order of dismissal invariably states that dismissal is
"upon the ground that the order appealed from does not finally
'15
determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.
The constitution of the state does indeed impose the general requirement that, in civil actions or proceedings, an appeal as of
right to the court of appeals and an appeal by permission of the
court of appeals can be taken only from a judgment or order enOver the past several years, the court, sensitive to the bar's desire for some explanation on
pre-argument finality rulings, has expanded upon its entries and now frequently includes a
description of the pertinent portions of the order below and citation to published authority.
Such entries, however, are not digested, making research difficult. Reported discussion is
likely to be found in cases where jurisdiction is sustained; the court may explain the jurisdictional principle in an opinion which addresses the merits of the appeal. A recent example
is Feinstein v. Bergner, 48 N.Y.2d 234 n.1, 397 N.E.2d 1161, 1162 n.1, 422 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357
n.1 (1979). See note 7 supra.
10 The major treatise on the court of appeals is The Powers of the New York Court of
Appeals, authored by Henry Cohen and Arthur Karger, a revised edition of which was published in 1952. Cohen and Karger provide a comprehensive review and analysis of all aspects
of the court's jurisdiction, including finality. Even though there have been substantial statutory changes and caselaw developments since 1952, the most notable of which is the replacement of the Civil Practice Act with the Civil Practice Law and Rules in 1963, their work is
extensively used and frequently cited by the court itself. Professor Siegel concludes that the
continued relevance of the Cohen and Karger treatise "is a further testimonial to the staying power of some of the limitations on, and, occasionally, idiosyncracies of, Court of Appeals practice." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw § 5601, commentary at 492 (McKinney 1978).
1'See notes 15-61 and accompanying text infra.
12 See notes 62-87 and accompanying text infra.
IsSee notes 88-207 and accompanying text infra.
14 See notes 208-216 and accompanying text infra.
15E.g., Inland Credit Corp. v. Weiss, 46 N.Y.2d 849, 849, 386 N.E.2d 1336, 1336, 414
N.Y.S.2d 315, 315 (1979); Joffe v. Rubenstein, 21 N.Y.2d 721, 722, 234 N.E.2d 706, 706, 287
N.Y.S.2d 685, 685 (1968).
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tered upon an appellate division determination which "finally determines" the action or proceeding. 16
History

The issue whether a particular order or judgment is final
"within the meaning of the Constitution" reaches to the foundation of the court's historical purpose. The finality requirement was
not established out of whim or caprice; its framers had very definite conceptions of the role and functions the court of appeals
should serve atop the state's judicial establishment. The court was
not intended to serve as an additional-if final-forum for litigants
dissatisfied with the results obtained in the court of original instance and in the court of first appeal. To the contrary, the four
appellate divisions were envisaged as being the court of last resort
for the majority of litigants.17 The court of appeals was to serve a
more limited purpose: it would be the final arbiter of state-wide
rules of law which would serve as a guide to the conduct of the
general population. Thus, the impact of a court of appeals determination in a particular case was perceived as being less important,
in a constitutional sense, than the promulgation of law which could
be uniformly applied by other courts of the state to other
litigants.18
The crucial point regarding finality is that the constitution reflects a fundamental decision to leave final responsibility for certain matters, such as those pertaining to practice, squarely in the
courtrooms of the appellate division, subject to limited exceptions. 9 As a result, whether a particular determination is final
11

N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(b)(1), (2), (6).
See notes 40-55 and accompanying text infra.
That an individual party to a case may benefit from a court of appeals' decision is, in

theory, but most certainly not in actuality, incidental. As Benjamin Cardozo eloquently

stated:
The Court exists, not for the individual litigant, but for the indefinite body of
litigants, whose causes are potentially involved in the specific cause at issue, the
wrongs of aggrieved suitors are only the algebraic symbols from which the Court is

to work out the formula of justice.
B. CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK 11 (2d
ed. 1909).
19 See N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 3(b)(4) (permitting appeal to the court of appeals from

non-final determinations of the appellate division on certified questions of law); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW §§ 5601(d), 5602(a)1(ii) (McKinney 1978) (permitting an appeal to the court of
appeals from certain trial court, administrative agency or appellate division determinations
where there is a prior non-final appellate division order "which necessarily affects" the judg-
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hinges, to a great degree, on whether the determination is on a preliminary issue over which the constitution intended to leave final
authority in the appellate division. To state the matter in different
terms, to ask if an order is final "within the meaning of the Constitution" is to ask whether the constitution intended to permit the
court of appeals to review this type of determination on direct
appeal.
Until 1846, there was no court of appeals. The early constitutions of this state placed ultimate judicial authority in the Court
for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors.20 This
court was a "court" in name only; its members were the president
of the state senate, 2 1 all members of the senate, the chancellor, and
the justices of the state supreme court.2 2 As might be anticipated,
the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors eventually outlived its usefulness. The court, with a full complement of thirty-seven members, was unwieldly. Even more importantly, however, the presence of the members of the senate
adversely affected the independence of the court since the senators, who possessed a numerical majority in the court, were apparently unwilling to free themselves of political influences. 23 Moreover, the fact that a majority of the senate were laymen detracted
from the respect accorded the court's judgments 24 because they
were not likely to have the finely honed legal skills expected of
25
members of a court of last resort.
ment or determination now under review).
20 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXII; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. V, § 1; see Karger, The
New York Court of Appeals: Some Aspects of the Limitations on Its Jurisdiction,27 REc.
N.Y.C.B.A. 370, 370-71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Karger].
21 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XX; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. III, § 7. The president of the
Senate was the Lieutenant Governor. Curiously, there was considerable dispute whether the
Lieutenant Governor could vote on decisions. See 1 C. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HisTORY OF NEW YORK 209 (1905); Lieutenant Governor's Claim, 2 Wend. 213, 216 (1829). The
Lieutenant Governor prevailed by a vote of 23 to 5. Id.
22 N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXII; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. V, § 1; see H. SCOTT, THE
COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 274, 293 (1909). Whenever a judgment of the supreme
court was brought to the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors
by a writ of error that raised a question of law, the supreme court justices were barred from
voting. They were only permitted to "assign the reasons of such their judgment." N.Y.
CONST. of 1777, art. XXXII; see N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. V, §1.
23 II C. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 145-46 (1905). As an illustration, the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors declared
only three statutes unconstitutional during its entire 70 years of existence. Id. at 146.
2, Id. at 145 (1906). See also A. CHESTER, THE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW
YORK 381 (1911).
25 See II C. LINCOLN, supra note 23, at 145.
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The constitution of 1846 did away with the old Court for the
Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors.26 In its place
was created a new eight-judge court of appeals. Four judges were
elected by the voters; the other four were selected from the class of
supreme court justices having the shortest time to serve." The
1846 constitution, however, did not elaborate on the jurisdiction
afforded this new court.28
In 1869, the voters approved a new judiciary article which
amended the 1846 constitution. The prime reform made by the
1869 amendments was to fix the membership of the court of appeals at seven (a chief judge and six associate judges), all of whom
were elected by the people of the state. Although there was at least
one proposal at the constitutional convention of 1867 to prescribe 2a9
method for constitutionally regulating the court's jurisdiction,
the 1869 amendments did not address the nature and extent of the
court's jurisdiction. As a result, the establishment of the jurisdiction of the court of appeals was left to the unfettered control of the
state legislature."
The legislature was extremely liberal in permitting appeals to
the court of appeals.3 " Under the Throop Code of 1876,2 for exam2"

See N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, § 1; II A.

CHESTER, THE LEGAL AND

JUDmCIAL His-

112 (1911). The constitution did leave a court for the trial of impeachments to be composed of the president of the senate, the senators, and the judges of the
court of appeals. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, § 1.
27 N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. VI, § 2; see I A. CHESTER, supra note 24
at 381; H. COHEN &
A. KARGER, supra note 1, at 20.
28 See H. COHEN & A. KARGER supra note 1, at 18; I W. RUMSEY, THE PRACTICE IN CIVIL
ACTIONS 60 (2d ed. 1902).
29 II C. LINCOLN, supra note 23, at 260. The proposal precluded appeals as of right to
the court of appeals and limited the court to hearing appeals authorized by the general
terms of the supreme court. Id.
20 See H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, at 21; I W. RUMSEY, supra note 28, at 60.
2" See notes 32-35 and accompanying text infra. Of the exceptions to this liberality, two
are worthy of note. An order granting a new trial could be appealed only if the appellant, in
the notice of appeal, assented that, if the order were affirmed, judgment absolute would be
rendered against him. Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 448, § 191(1), [1876] N.Y. Laws 34 (repealed 1909). This is analogous to the present day stipulation for judgment absolute. See
N.Y. CONsT. art. 6, § 3(b)(3); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5601(c) (McKinney 1978). Further, an
appeal could not be taken from a judgment, except in an action affecting title to realty,
unless the matter in controversy was $500 or more. Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 448, §
191(3), [1876] N.Y. Laws 34 (repealed 1909). Today, a monetary threshold which an appellant must satisfy in order to appeal to the court of appeals is prohibited by the constitution.
N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3(a).
12 Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 448, §§ 190-361, [1876] N.Y. Laws 33-66 (repealed 1909).
The legislature frequently amended the statutes so as to expand the court's jurisdiction. See
II REVISED RECORD OF 1894 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 895 (1900) [hereinafter cited as H
TORY OF NEW YORK
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ple, the court was empowered to review final judgments of the general terms of the supreme court 3 and of the superior city courts.
Upon such appeal, the court could review any interlocutory judgments or intermediate orders that involved the merits and necessarily affected the final judgment.3 4 In addition, subject to certain
exceptions, many non-final determinations could be appealed from
the specified lower courts. An order affecting a substantial right
and not made in an exercise of discretion could be appealed to the
court of appeals if the order: (1) "in effect" determined the action
and prevented entry of a final judgment; (2) discontinued the action; (3) granted or refused a new trial; (4) struck a pleading or a
part thereof; (5) decided an "interlocutory" application or a "ques35
tion of practice"; or (6) declared a state statute unconstitutional.
In large measure, the ready availability of appeals to the court
of appeals, made the court unable to efficiently dispose of its
caseload in the last quarter of the 19th Century. In fact, its
caseload fell years behind.38 Temporary measures to reduce the
logjam of cases included the creation of a Commission on Appeals
in 186937 and of a second division of the court of appeals in 1889.38
The creation of additional and co-equal tribunals to supplement
REVISED RECORD]; Explanatory Statement of the Judiciary Committee Relative to the Proposed Judiciary Article, in 2 DocuMENTs OF THE 1894 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION Doc. No.
53, at 6 [hereinafter cited as Judiciary Committee Report].
33 H. Scorr, supra note 22, at 253. The general term of the supreme court was the
forerunner of our present day appellate division. Id.
31 Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 448, § 190(1), [1876] N.Y. Laws 35 (repealed 1909). The
statute implicitly recognized three types of determinations: the first was a final judgment,
the second an "interlocutory judgment" and the third an intermediate order. An interlocutory judgment was defined as "an intermediate or incomplete judgment, where the rights of
the parties are settled but something remains to be done." Cambridge Valley Nat'1 Bank v.
Lynch, 76 N.Y. 514, 516 (1879). Thus, a judgment which fixed liability but directed that an
accounting be made or that damages be ascertained was viewed as "interlocutory"; a determination which sustained a demurrer to a complaint but granted leave to amend the challenged pleading was held not to be an interlocutory judgment-it being only an intermediate order. Id.
35 Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 448, § 190(2), [1876] N.Y. Laws 34 (repealed 1909). For
a helpful explanation of the statutory derivations of the provisions of § 190(2), see H. COHEN
& A. KARGER, supra note 1, at 19 n.8.
36 See H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, at 18.
37 N.Y. CONST. of 1869, art. VI, § 4; see H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, at 21. As
Lincoln points out, the judiciary article of the constitution of 1869 was the only portion of
the constitution to be accepted. II C. LINCOLN, supra note 23, at 464. On the proposals
preceding the creation of the temporary commission, see II C. LINCOLN, supra note 23, at
262-64.
38 N.Y. CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 7. See H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, at 22; II
C. LINCOLN, supra note 23, at 585-86.
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the court of appeals, however, soon led to unsatisfactory inconsistencies between rulings of the court and the supplemental tribunals.3" Meaningful and permanent reform was required.
The state's entire appellate system was overhauled in the constitution of 1894. The fundamental purposes of the 1894 constitution were to improve the quality of appellate justice rendered in
the old general terms, which were renamed appellate divisions; to
foster respect for the appellate division determinations by making
these decisions final in the majority of cases; and to limit the court
of appeals to the function of providing ultimate and certain exposition of the law of the state.4 °
The judiciary committee to the 1894 convention expressed the
view that the state was required "to give to its citizens one trial of
their controversies and one review of the rulings and results of the
trial by a competent and impartial appellate tribunal"; the committee members perceived "no consideration, either of public duty
or of the private interests involved in litigation, which requires a
second appeal and a second review. "41 The committee recognized,
however, that the great "volume of business" prevented creation of
a single appellate court to review all decisions of the courts of the
first instance. 42 As three or four courts would be needed to administer the appellate caseload, and the opinions of these courts were
"certain to vary, differ or conflict," the law could only be settled if
these separate tribunals were controlled by a higher authority. 3
The committee, in an authoritative explanation of the purpose of
the court of appeals, declared:
The public interests demand that the law should be settled; that
it should be the same for the whole State; that it should be a
31 II
40

A. CHESTER, supra note 26, at 315.

See Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 32, at 1, 4-6; H.

COHEN

& A.

KARGER,

supra note 1, at 22-25. See generally II A. CHESTER, supra note 26, at 319-20. The revisions
made by the 1894 constitution established the basic framework for the appellate system
which exists today. See notes 56-61 and accompanying text infra.
41 Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 40, at 463-64.
42 Id. at 464.
'3Id. Elihu Root, the chairman of the judiciary committee, explained the need for a
single court which would finally determine the law of the state:
It is necessary, in order that the law shall be settled, shall be clear, shall be harmonious, shall be known, and shall be a guide for the conduct of all the people of
the State, that some one supreme authority shall overrule and supervise the decisions of these various courts of original appeal, and once and for all declare what
is the law. That is the sole reason for the existence of the Court of Appeals.

II

REVISED RECORD,

supra note 32, at 893.
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consistent and harmonious system; that it should be declared
clearly and authoritatively by some supreme power, in order not
merely that litigants may have their right, but that the whole
people may know what is the law, by which their contracts and
conduct shall be regulated, and by the observance of which they
may, if possible, keep out of litigation.
The occasion which gives rise to a second single appellate tribunal marks the limit of its proper and necessary function to settle and make certain the law, not only for litigants, but for all the
people. Whatever limitations upon its jurisdiction or the scope of
its action, and whatever provisions regarding its constitution and
procedure are consistent with the full and effective exercise of
the exerthat function, are permissible. Whatever interferes with
4
cise of that function should be by all means avoided. 4

According to the committee, review by the general terms was
not effective because, in part, the "[w]ant of finality in their judgments decreases the respect for their authority and their sense of
responsibility."'45 Moreover, the committee observed that "the disposition to take a second appeal grows and the legislature constantly enlarges the opportunity," and as a result, "the Court of
Appeals is overloaded with work, a very considerable portion of
which is wholly46outside of its proper and necessary function of settling the law.'
44 Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 32, at 464. See H. COHEN & A. KARGER,
supra note 1, at 23.
" Judiciary Committee Report, supranote 32, at 5; see III C. LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK 356-57 (1905); see generally II A. CHESTER, supra note 26 at 320-21.
As Mr. Root noted in an address to the convention, the 1867 constitution presumed
that the court of appeals would review all decisions of the general terms and that the "General Terms would so sift out the appeals which came to them that only so many would go to
the Court of Appeals as it should be able to take care of." II REVISED RECORD, supra note
32, at 893-94. Even after several years, however, little sifting occurred. According to Mr.
Root, this was due to two factors. First, the general terms, consisting of three members, were
too small for proper deliberation. Second, the general term justices, in addition to their
appellate duties, were also required to do a full share of trial work. Cases would be heard
and decided by only two justices, the general term justices often sat in review of each other's
decisions below, and the press of work led to the shortening of arguments, leaving litigants
"feeling dissatisfied and [with the feeling] that they had not had an opportunity for the full
presentation of their cases." Id. at 894.
46 Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 32, at 465. See also Reed v. McCord, 160
N.Y. 330, 335-37, 54 N.E. 737, 738-39 (1899). Constant enlargement of the scope of appeal
from general term to the court of appeals "opened doorway after doorway, through which
constantly additional kinds of questions could be taken up to the Court of Appeals, so that
the finality of the judgment of the General Term has been constantly decreased, and, there-
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The purpose of the revised constitution was plainly stated:
Our purpose is to draw the line distinctly around the questions
which the Court of Appeals, and that court alone, ought to
determine finally; to leave all other questions to the court first
reviewing the cause; and to make that court fully competent to
protect satisfactorily every right of a litigant.47
To accomplish this end, the committee fixed upon a requirement that appeals to the court of appeals be generally limited to
appeals from final determinations. 4 Elihu Root, the chairman of
the judiciary committee, stated that in framing the article, the
committee "endeavored to follow a clear line of logical distinction
between the proper functions of this Court of Appeals and the
courts of first review, a line of distinction marked out by the very
'49
definition of the proper function of a court of second appeal.
The "line of logical distinction" required that the court of appeals be limited to "the function of settling and declaring the
law."5 0 Regarding the review of questions of fact, it was decided
that where the trial court found a fact to be established, and the
fore, respect for their decisions has been decreased, and their own sense of responsibility has
been decreased." II REVISED RECORD, supra note 32, at 895.
41 Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 32, at 465.
18 Id. The committee considered and rejected a number of other proposals. The concepts of splitting the court into two divisions and of having many judges rotate in service on
the court were rejected. The committee opined that division of the court or rotation of its
members would impair the "unity of the Court," would prevent "consistent harmony of its
views upon the fundamental questions which underlie the determination of causes," and
would make the law uncertain. Id. at 466.
The committee found in favor of the abolishment of a monetary limit. "Important cases
of law arise in small cases, as well as in large ones." Id. "[The] great majority of the people
have only small cases to be determined, and this should be their court, if they choose to
avail themselves of it, as well as the court of their wealthy fellow-citizens." Id. at 466.
Chairman Root drew applause from the members of the convention when he stated that
the court of appeals should be "the people's court"-"the court of the poor man, so that he
may feel that he may go there if he wants to, with his question of law . . . ." II REVISED
RECORD, supra note 32, at 898. Not only did the committee believe that no monetary limit
should be added, it also provided "that the limit now existing should be taken off, and that
no such limit shall ever be imposed." Id.
Nor did the committee see wisdom in limiting appeals to specified classes of cases.
Human foresight could not prevent mistakes from being made in a permanent constitution.
The committee reasoned: "[T]here is an element of unfairness toward those citizens who are
interested in the particular classes of cases excluded from the numeration; and... similar
questions of law arise in different classes of cases, so that there would be different courts of
last resort passing on the same questions." Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 32, at
466.
"' II REVISED RECORD, supra note 32, at 896.
60

Id.
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five justices of the appellate division unanimously agreed, the controversy about that fact should stop. 51 Mr. Root's comments on
questions of law relating specifically to practice bear directly on
many issues that the court today would declare non-final in nature:
"Why should this court, which is to declare the law for all the people, be bothered about petty questions of practice, which can as
well be settled by the appellate tribunal which we now constitute,
'52
as by the Court of Appeals?
To implement these policies, the 1894 constitution provided
that appeals could be taken as of right to the court of appeals
"only from judgments or orders entered upon decisions of the appellate division of the supreme court, finally determining actions or
special proceedings, and from orders granting new trials on exceptions, where the appellants stipulate that upon affirmance, judgment absolute shall be rendered against them. 5 3 A small loophole,
however, was appended: the appellate division in any department
could permit an appeal "upon any question of law which,
in its
' 54
opinion, ought to be reviewed by the Court of Appeals."
The finality requirement was thus designed to accomplish
three different objectives. The first was to strengthen the authority
of, and enhance the respect for, the four appellate divisions by
making them the courts of last resort for most litigants. The second was to enable the court of appeals to function solely as the
final arbiter not of particular cases but of the crucial issue of state
law likely to arise on appeals from final judgments or orders.
Third, it was intended to screen out less important questions of
1,Id. at 897;

see Judiciary Committee Report, supra note 32, at 465.

52 II REVISED RECORD, supra note 32, at 897.

53N.Y. CONST. of 1894, art. VI, § 9.
11 Id. This exception to the general rule of finality is the forerunner of the present
constitutional provision which permits the appellate division to grant an appellant leave to
appeal to the court of appeals from a non-final order upon certified questions of law. N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(4); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 5602(b)(1), 5612(b), 5713 (McKinney
1978).
Upon analysis, it becomes clear that the exception does no violence to the principles
underlying the general finality rule. Since the finality requirement was designed, in part, to
preserve the respect for the appellate division by finalizing its decision on preliminary matters, there should be no concern where that court deems fit to authorize a further appeal,
particularly since experience reflects that such permission is sparingly granted. Moreover,
the court of appeals, as arbiter of questions of law, receives appeals which, in the opinion of
the majority of the appellate division, involve important issues of law. Indeed, the provision
assures that important issues arising in non-final contexts, which otherwise might not be
heard or otherwise might be delayed by the need to complete further proceedings below, can
be presented to the court of appeals promptly.
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law, such as those relating to "petty practice," from the jurisdiction of the court of appeals and to vest final authority for those
questions in the appellate division. 5
The Finality Rule Today
The New York constitution continues to provide for a general
requirement of finality in order to proceed on appeal to the court
of appeals. With limited exceptions,5 6 an appeal as of right to the
court of appeals and an appeal by permission of the court of appeals can be taken only from an order or judgment which "finally
determines an action or special proceeding. ' 57 The finality rule is
so fixed that, while the constitution permits the legislature to abolish all appeals as of right in civil cases, 58 provided no constitutional
issue is directly involved,5 9 all abolished categories of appeals must
then be governed by the constitutional provision authorizing appeal from final appellate division determinations by permission of
either the appellate division or the court of appeals.6 0 In fact, however, the legislature has granted the court of appeals all of the jurisdiction authorized by the constitution, which it retains today. 6 '
55 The reservation of practice questions to the appellate division has the salutory effect
of giving a regional tribunal some latitude to adjust the regulation of particular civil practice
questions, to the extent permitted by law, to meet more localized concerns and standards.
5 The two principal exceptions to the finality requirement are carry-overs from the
constitution of 1894. See notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra. One is the provision
that an order of the appellate division granting a new trial in a civil action can be appealed
if the appellant stipulates that, in the event of affirmance, judgment absolute shall be entered against him. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(3). The other major exception is that a nonfinal determination of the appellate division can be appealed to the court of appeals where
the appellate division grants permission and certifies that questions of law have arisen that
should be reviewed by the court of appeals. Id. § 3(b)(4).
57 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(1),(2),(6).
Id. § 3(b)(8).
'8

Id.

Id. § 3(b)(6),(8). The proposed 1967 constitution-which was rejected by the peoI0
ple-would have provided that (1) appeals as of right in civil cases would lie in any case in
which constitutional issues were involved; (2) that appeals in civil cases could be had by
permission of the appellate division from non-final determinations or by permission of either the court of appeals or the appellate division from final determinations; and (3) appeals
in all other cases could be had where permitted by law or court rule. See Art. V, § 2 of
Proposed 1967 Constitution, Proceedings of New York State Constitutional Convention of
1967, Vol. XI, Documents, Doc. No. 60.
81 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW

§§

5601, 5602 (McKinney 1978).

1980]

RULE OF FINALITY

Finality: Standards and Considerations
While the constitution directs that appeals as of right to the
court of appeals and appeals by permission of the court itself generally can be taken only from an order or judgment that "finally
determines an action or special proceeding,"6 2 the constitution
does not provide any definition of the term "finally determines."
Indeed, the clear constitutional directive on the document to be
considered the appealable "paper"-and thus the focus of a finality inquiry-has been neatly shelved as an antiquity. The result is
that while, in theory, finality determinations are made "within the
meaning of the constitution," in practice, statute13 and case law
precedent control. 4
The threshold issue in any finality inquiry is to identify the
paper whose finality is to be considered. 5 By statute, that paper is
the order of the appellate division. This statement is not as obvious as it would appear on the surface. Under a literal reading of
the constitution, a determination of the appellate division in a civil
action could not be appealed directly; the appellant had to await
the entry of a judgment in the trial court which put the appellate
division determination into effect, and then appeal from that judgment.67 This practice was discarded with the enactment of the
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR).68
Today, most appeals to the court of appeals, in both actions
and special proceedings, must be taken from the dispositive paper" of the appellate division.70 The determination made by the
1 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(1), (6).

See notes 66-68 and accompanying text infra.
7 WK&M supra note 2, 1 5611.01a.
5 See generally H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 10, at 39-40.
66 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5611 (McKinney 1978); see D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE §
527, at 727 (1978).
" Secor v. Levine, 296 N.Y. 1020, 1021, 73 N.E. 2d 726, 726-27 (1947) (mem.) (order of
the appellate division could not be appealed even as a non-final determination with the
permission of the appellate division).
68 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5512(a) (McKinney 1978). The prior practice led to confusion in that one route was prescribed for actions and a different route was established for
special proceedings. Whila in an action the appeal was from a judgment or order entered by
the trial court pursuant to an appellate division determination, in a special proceeding the
appeal could be taken directly from the order of the appellate division. N.Y. Civil Practice
Act, ch. 297, § 591, [1942] N.Y. Laws 870 (repealed and superseded 1962). The court of
appeals considered this distinction to be "unfortunate" and "confusing." Purchasing Assocs.
v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 275, 196 N.E.2d 245, 249, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606 (1963).
9 The term "dispositive paper" is used advisedly. Generally, an appellate division determination is embodied in either an order or a judgment. Unlike a trial court judgment
63

64
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court of first instance is not relevant to a finality assessment, except to the extent that the determination is confirmed by the appellate division. Thus, it is the order of the appellate division and
not any subsequent judgment or order 7 1 that must be studied in
order to determine if the finality requirement has been satisfied.
Having resolved the threshold issue of the appealable paper,
the CPLR does not offer any useful standard by which to measure
the finality of the appellate division order. 72 CPLR 5611 provides
only that an appellate division order should be considered final if
which "is the resolution of the dispute" and "the embodiment of the verdict or decision," D.
SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 409, at 541 (1978), an order is merely "the determination of a
motion," 2A WK&M supra note 2, %2211.01 (footnote omitted); see CPLR 2211, and does
not, in and of itself, finally determine the rights of the parties, see Marsh v. Johnston, 123
App. Div. 596, 597, 108 N.Y.S. 161, 161-62 (2d Dep't 1908). See also Concourse Super Serv.
Station, Inc. v. Price, 33 Misc. 2d 503, 503, 226 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1962). For the purpose of further appeal, however, an order of the appellate division "is
deemed to embody the 'final' determination," N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5601, commentary at
493 (McKinney 1978), and hence, CPLR 5512(a) mandates, generally, that such order is the
proper paper from which the appeal is to be taken.
There are some situations where the appellate division determination is embodied in a
judgment rather than in an order. The primary example of this situation is the article 78
proceeding, N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW art. 78, which may be transferred from the supreme court
to the appellate division for initial determination, which determination is made in the form
of a judgment. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 7804(g), 7806.
The term "order" is frequently used in this article to refer to the dispositive paper of
the appellate division since orders are the most frequently encountered type of dispositive
paper. Where appropriate, however, the term "judgment" may be substituted.
70 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5512(a) (McKinney 1978). This general rule is applicable
where the appeal to the court of appeals is from an appellate determination; there are instances where an appeal can be taken from the judgment of the trial court. See N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW §§ 5601(b)(2), 5601(d) (McKinney 1978).
Although the practice sanctioned by the CPLR of direct appeal from the appellate division order seemingly contradicted the constitution, the practice was quickly sustained as
constitutional by the court of appeals. Purchasing Assocs. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 275, 196
N.E.2d 245, 249, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600, 606 (1963). The court held that "the CPLR may properly be read as treating the order of the Appellate Division in such circumstances as the
equivalent of a judgment for purposes of appeal." Id.
If the appellant mistakenly appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to the appellate
division order, the mistake can be disregarded if the appeal is timely, if the proper paper is
furnished to the court of appeals, and if there is no prejudice. Id.; see N.Y. Civ. PRAc LAW §
5512, commentary at 131-32 (McKinney 1978). If, however, an appeal is mistakenly taken
from a judgment of special term entered upon an appellate division order and the time to
appeal the appellate division order passes, the appeal will be dismissed. See Rodolitz v.
Neptune Paper Prods., Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 383, 387, 239 N.E.2d 628, 631, 292 N.Y.S.2d 878, 882
(1968).
7' See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5611 (McKinney 1978); Second Preliminary Report of the
Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, Leg. Doc. (1958) No. 13, at 360-61.
72 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5611, commentary at 543-44 (McKinney 1978); 7 WK&M,
supra note 2, 6611.01a.
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the appellate division "disposes of all the issues in the action...
,,$3 On the surface, this language simply rephrases the question
without providing any insight to the answer.7 4 It can be read as
merely codifying the well-settled rule that a determination which
resolves all the issues in a litigation is final. 75 Few serious finality
disputes, however, arise in cases where all the issues have been determined by the appellate division. Virtually all arise in situations
where the appellate division order has addressed fewer than all the
76
issues in the action.
Although an order which resolves all the issues is certainly
final, the obverse is not necessarily true. An order which resolves
fewer than all the issues can be final in some circumstances. A substantial body of case law provides finality rules in these situations;7 7 thus, CPLR 5611 should not be regarded as the exclusive
7s
definition of finality.

CPLR 5611 confirms the principle that the finality focus prop71 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5611 (McKinney 1978). The term "action," for purposes of
section 5611, includes both civil actions and special proceedings. See id. § 105(b). The initial draft of section 5611 was even more nebulous than the language of the provision actually enacted. The draft provided that finality would not exist unless the appellate division
disposed of all issues in the "case." See Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, Leg. Doc. (1958) No. 13, at 361.
It should be noted that the advisory committee apparently did not intend to provide a
clear standard by which to measure finality issues. See generally 7 WK&M, supra note 2, 1
5611.03. Indeed, given the many facets of the finality rule and the necessary exceptions,
complications, and limitations, no ready definition may be possible. The revisors' purpose
was more limited. As previously discussed, the principal purpose was to clarify prior practice
with respect to the appealable paper. As a corollary, the advisory committee also intended,
by giving some definition to the term "finality," to prevent a second appeal to the appellate
division on the same issues that were before it on a prior appeal. See Second Preliminary
Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure, Leg. Doc. (1958) No. 13, at
360. Thus, § 5611 must be read together with § 5701(c) which forbids an appeal to the
appellate division from any order or judgment entered pursuant to a prior appellate division
order "which disposes of all the issues in the action."
Nevertheless, in setting forth a rule that measures finality by whether the appellate
division disposed of all the issues in the action, § 5611 provides a basis upon which practitioners may ground arguments for holding that a particular order is final or non-final. The
test provided in § 5611 is certainly not exclusive. See notes. 65-66 and accompanying text
supra.
7' See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5611, commentary at 544 (McKinney 1978).
75 7 WK&M, supra note 2, 1 5611.03.
76 Id. See generally N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5611, commentary at 544 (McKinney 1978).
77A
leading example of a situation where an order which resolves fewer than all the
issues, yet, may be considered final, involves the concept of implied severance discussed in
notes 163-207 and accompanying text infra.
78 D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 527, at 727 (1978); 7 WK&M, supra note 2, T
5611.03.
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erly should be on the effect the appellate division order has upon
the entire action.7 9 An order that finally determines all the issues
raised on the particular appeal may not dispose of all the issues in
the action and hence may be non-final.8 0 Some appellate counsel
tend to overlook this distinction and, in arguing for finality, note
that the appellate division finally determined all that was before it.
This, however, is not enough. More fundamentally, there is a conceptual difficulty in phrasing a finality rule in terms of the issues
in the overall litigation. First, there can be, and often are, disputes
over the issues in a particular litigation. If there is dispute about
the nature and number of the issues, it follows that there will be
difficulty in determining whether any, some, or all of the issues
have been finally determined. Moreover, the issues in a case can be
both substantive and procedural. An appellate division order can
be final even though the substantive issues in the case have not
been finally resolved on the "merits.""" The converse is equally
true: that the appellate division has determined some or all of the
substantive issues on the merits does not, by itself, require a conclusion that the resulting order is a final one. 2
" Although not providing "an exclusive definition of finality," § 5611 "clarifies and
codifies the rule that a determination deciding all the issues in the case is final." 7 WK&M,
supra note 2, 5611.03 (emphasis added). Indeed, as Professors Cohen and Karger point
out, "the whole case must ordinarily be disposed of before finality is recognized." H. COHEN
& A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 11, at 43.
80 For example, in a civil action, where the trial court grants the plaintiff's motion requesting a jury trial and the resulting order is appealed to the appellate division, the disposition on appeal is not a final determination so as to allow immediate appeal to the court of
appeals, notwithstanding that the appellate division disposed of the only issue before it. See
Laventhall v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 291 N.Y. 657, 657-58, 51 N.E.2d 934, 934 (1943). Similarly,
an appeal from an interlocutory order sustaining the directing of reference has been held
non-final. Gold v. Rubin, 20 N.Y.2d 967, 968, 233 N.E.2d 859, 859, 286 N.Y.S.2d 857, 857
(1967).
81H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 37, at 153. Appellate division orders that
have the effect of terminating the litigation as to all or even some of the causes of action
have been held final, notwithstanding their failure to resolve the substantive issues on the
merits. The most common example of an order that does not reach the merits, but nonetheless is held final, is one that dismisses the complaint for want of jurisdiction, for legal incapacity to sue, or for other technical reasons. See H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, at
153-54 nn. 88, 89. Although not resolving the substantive issues, it is clear that such an
order "finally determines the action" within the meaning of the constitution.
81 For example, orders which strike or refuse to strike a defense, Flaks v. Fisher Millinery Corp., 300 N.Y. 643, 643, 90 N.E.2d 496, 496 (1950); Gillette v. Allen, 289 N.Y. 754,
754, 46 N.E.2d 355, 356 (1942); Paddock v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 12 N.Y. 591,
592 (1855), or which deny motions for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment,
Health Ins. Ass'n v. Harnett, 44 N.Y.2d 302, 314, 376 N.E.2d 1280, 1287, 405 N.Y.S.2d 634,
641 (1978); Kaufman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 272 N.Y. 508, 508, 4 N.E.2d 421, 421-22
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Rather than assessing, for finality purposes, an appellate division order in narrow terms of issue resolution, it is generally more
practicable and accurate to view the effect of the appellate division
order on the entire litigation. The practitioner should consider
whether the appellate division has determined to grant or to deny
relief of a lasting nature sought in the pleadings and whether steps
must be taken to implement the decision of the appellate division
or to bring the entire litigation to a conclusion. If further judicial
proceedings are needed to give practical effect to the appellate division determination, the likelihood is that the order is non-final. 3
If, however, the determination resolves the action, or a distinct
portion of the action, and no further proceedings are needed, the
case may well be final and therefore "ripe to impose on the time
and attention of the Court of Appeals." 4 Indeed, this sort of ripeness concept comports well with the intent of the framers of the
constitutional finality requirement.8 "
In determining whether the appellate division has put an end
to any portion of the litigation, the practitioner must look to the
basic claims raised in the pleadings. Determinations on procedural
matters, however important and however conclusively resolved below, are likely to be non-final unless the holding on the procedural
issue results in the final resolution of a claim, counterclaim or
crossclaim. Otherwise, the procedural determination is a matter of
"petty practice" which only serves to move the case further along
the path to a final determination. As previously noted, final authority for practice and administrative matters have been left to
the appellate division,86 subject only to the raising of such issues
on an appeal to the court of appeals at a later time after a final
order is entered.
The need or lack of need for further judicial consideration is
an important factor that is weighed carefully by the court of appeals when it determines whether to retain jurisdiction of a partic(1936); Caan v. Steir, 266 N.Y. 406, 406, 195 N.E. 128, 128 (1934), despite being determinations on the merits, have been held non-final. See H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, §
40, at 161 & nn.17, 19 & 20.
83 See H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 11, at 47. Professor Siegel notes that
"[finality] has usually been given a pragmatic interpretation, meaning a judgment or order
which puts an end to the case, or to a logically separable part of it, and leaves nothing else
in respect of it to be decided." D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 527, at 727 (1978).
84 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5601, commentary at 492 (McKinney 1978).
See notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra.
88 See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
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ular appeal.8 7 Litigation brought before a court or judge for further
consideration may obviate the need for the appeal. For example, if
the appellate division denies a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a cause of action and remits the matter for trial, the
defendant may prevail at the trial, eliminating the need for a court
of appeals review of the propriety of the initial appellate division
determination. Accordingly, in assessing an order for finality purposes, a practitioner should consider whether any matter has been
left open for further judicial review below and if so, whether the
further consideration is of the kind that could alter the positions of
the parties.
Counsel should also consider whether the parties can reach
agreement to resolve the issues left open for further proceedings in
order to finalize the appeal. For example, if the order of the appellate division finally adjudicates the issue of liability in favor of the
plaintiff but leaves the question of damages open for a new trial, a
stipulation as to the amount of damages in the event liability is
sustained may obviate the need for further proceedings. The court
of appeals may then treat the order as having been "finalized" for
purposes of entertaining an appeal on liability. Thus, the parties
may be able to agree to finalize an otherwise non-final order.
FINALITY: ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

It has been stated authoritatively that no general rule can give
proper emphasis to the myriad aspects of the finality rule.8 8 Consequently, the general considerations outlined above may serve only
as a useful framework within which to consider a particular finality
issue. Specific finality issues have been litigated, and a review of
pertinent precedent may lend further assistance to practitioners
confronted with a finality issue. Given the great volume of court of
appeals determinations on finality questions, most of which are not
accompanied by opinion or other written elaboration, it is not possible to comment in this Article upon every decision. A review of
the more recent decisions on frequently encountered issues, however, may be useful to attorneys whose cases fall within the scope
of the cited authorities and will serve to illustrate the types of determinations that are considered final and those that are not.
:7

See H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 11.
COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 10, at 39.

I H.
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Pre-trialDeterminations

As a general rule, the court has held that the most frequently
encountered types of pre-trial rulings are non-final, unless a particular determination has the effect of putting an end to a distinct
part of the litigation. Thus, an order of the appellate division that
either affirms the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint s9 or
reverses the grant of such a motion" is non-final. Similarly, an order that denies 91 or grants92 a motion to amend a pleading is considered non-final. If, however, the appellate division determination
dismisses or affirms the dismissal of an entire pleading or a distinct
cause of action, the determination should be considered final to
that extent.9 3 Thus, for example, while orders that set aside service
of process are generally considered non-final,9 4the order is considered final if it also dismisses the complaint.
The rationale for these distinctions is plain: if the order
merely regulates the course of the litigation, while permitting it to
proceed further in the courts, the order is one of "petty practice,"
for which the appellate division has final appellate responsibility.
On the other hand, if the order has the effect of bringing the litigation or a distinct part of it to a halt, then the order or the pertinent portion of it is final.
A frequently encountered problem concerns orders that dismiss complaints or causes of action but grant the plaintiff leave to
plead over or to apply for permission to replead.9 5 This problem is
89Behren v. Papworth, 30 N.Y.2d 532, 533, 281 N.E.2d 178, 178-79, 330 N.Y.S.2d 381,
383 (1972) (per curiam).
10 Hodom v. Stearns, 25 N.Y.2d 722, 722, 255 N.E.2d 564, 565, 307 N.Y.S.2d 225, 225
(1969).
91Powell v. Gates-Chili Cent. School Dist., 41 N.Y.2d 827, 828, 361 N.E.2d 1039, 103940, 393 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (1977). An order which denies a motion to amend a pleading may
be appealed to the court of appeals if the appellate division grants leave for such an appeal.
See Krichmar v. Krichmar, 42 N.Y.2d 858, 366 N.E.2d 863, 397 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1977).
92 Degen & Schoen Co. v. Zemach David Dev. Corp., 9 N.Y.2d 1012, 1012, 176 N.E.2d
591, 592, 218 N.Y.S.2d 676, 676 (1961).
93N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW § 5601, commentary at 492 (McKinney 1978); 7 WK&M, supra
note 1, 1 5611.01a; see Tenavision, Inc. v. Newman, 45 N.Y.2d 145, 379 N.E.2d 1166, 405
N.Y.S.2d 36 (1978); Miles v. R & M Appliance Sales, Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 451, 259 N.E.2d 913,
311 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1970).
94 Feinstein v. Bergner, 48 N.Y.2d 234, 237 n.1, 397 N.E.2d 1161, 1162 n.1, 422 N.Y.S.2d
356, 357 n.1 (1979). An order that denies a motion to change venue is also non-final. Jackson
v. City of Buffalo, 30 N.Y.2d 749, 750, 284 N.E.2d 158, 158, 333 N.Y.S.2d 175, 175 (1972).
11Pursuant to CPLR 3211(e), leave to replead may be requested by a plaintiff if the
defendant has moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 3211(e) (McKinney 1970). "Intended to obviate the former
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partially addressed by the second sentence of CPLR 5611 which
provides that "[i]f the aggrieved party is granted leave to replead
or to perform some other act which would defeat the finality of the
order, it shall not take effect as a final order until the expiration of
the time limited for such act without his having performed it." ' In
other words, if the appellate division order permits repleading
within a specified number of days, and those days pass without
repleading, the order becomes final.9 7 Should the aggrieved party
take advantage of the opportunity to replead, however, the order
would be non-final.9 8
CPLR 5611 does not address a significant problem that may
arise when the appellate division grants leave to replead but does
not specify a time period within which the repleading must be accomplished. Nor does the statute cover the situation where the appellate division authorizes the pleader to apply at special term for
permission to replead and does not set a time limit for the service
of a motion for such permission. By its terms, CPLR 5611 is not
applicable unless a specific time limit is fixed.9 9 The court of appeals in recent decisions, appears to have held that such orders are
non-final, at least in the absence of a formal waiver of the option
to replead. 100
loose practice and undue liberality with which leave to replead was granted under the Civil
Practice Act," CPLR 3211(e) conditions the granting of such leave not only on the formal
correction of the deficient pleading, but also, in the discretion of the court, on the submission of evidence tending to establish the validity of the cause of action. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. v. John David, Inc., 25 App. Div. 2d 133, 135, 267 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (1st Dep't
1966); see N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 3211(e) (McKinney 1970).
11 N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 5611 (McKinney 1978).
97 Id., commentary at 545 (McKinney 1978). See Greschler v. Greschler, 71 App. Div.
2d 332, 422 N.Y.S.2d 718 (2d Dep't 1979)(complaint dismissed with leave to replead within
20 days of service of order with notice of entry), motion to dismiss appeal denied, N.Y.L.J.,
March 31, 1980, at 5, col. 1; see also 7 WK&M, supra note 2, 5611.05; H. COHEN & A.
KARGER, supra note 1, § 14.
Counsel who elect not to replead should be careful to serve and file a notice of appeal or
a motion for leave to appeal timely, irrespective whether the time within which to replead
extends beyond the statutory time for taking an appeal. CPLR 5611 does not enlarge the
time within which to pursue an appeal, and, with the abandonment of the option to replead,
counsel should not allow the appeal to be abandoned either.
98 7 WK&M, supra note 2, T 5611.05; N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5611, commentary at 545
(McKinney 1978); see Department of Health v. Natural Plating Corp., 11 N.Y.2d 674, 675,
180 N.E.2d 906, 906, 225 N.Y.S.2d 751, 751 (1962).
" 7 WK&M, supra note 2, 5611.05.
,00 Compare C.E. Hooper, Inc. v. Perlberg, Monness, Williams & Sidel, 49 N.Y.2d 736
(1979) and New York Auction Co. v. Belt, 40 N.Y.2d 1079 (1976) (appeals dismissed for
want of finality) with Shoreco Int'l. Inc. v. Ivy Hill Communications Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 863,
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If, based upon an assessment of the facts of the case, an attorney concludes that the repleading cannot be accomplished successfully, as when the facts would not support the new pleading, and
that an appeal is the client's best remedy, counsel might consider
the execution and service of a written waiver of the option to replead. Upon the execution and service of such a waiver, the action
logically should be considered as having been finally determined,
since the existing pleading was found insufficient and no further
repleading is possible. An appeal may then be available either as of
right or by permission. The hazards of such a course are obvious: if
the client has some opportunity, however small, of prevailing upon
repleading, prudence would suggest that an appeal not be taken
until the action has been concluded below.
On the pre-trial motion to dismiss, special mention should be
made of an appellate division order that directs the dismissal of a
complaint for failure to prosecute. 101 Although the orders are final,
the court has dismissed or denied appeals from such orders on the
ground that it lacked the authority to review such
10 2
determinations.
Consistent with the general rule on pre-trial determinations,
orders granting or refusing provisional remedies, such as arrest or
attachment generally are considered to be non-final in nature.
Thus, orders granting or denying preliminary injunctions are non10 3
final according to well-settled case law.
This does not mean that whenever equitable relief is sought,
finality will not exist. If a decree is issued in the nature of mandamus which grants relief that is outside the scope of the litigation,
346 N.E.2d 250, 382 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1976) (appeal decided on the merits); see H. COHEN & A.
KARGER, supra note 1, § 74, at 323; § 40, at 161.
101 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 3216(a) (McKinney 1970).
102 E.g., Williams v. Cunningham, 44 N.Y.2d 731, 731, 376 N.E.2d 933, 933, 405
N.Y.S.2d 460, 460 (1978); Rabetoy v. Atkinson, 37 N.Y.2d 803, 803, 337 N.E.2d 616, 616, 375
N.Y.S.2d 111, 111 (1975); Jacobs v. Chemical Bank of New York Trust Co., 30 N.Y.2d 750,
750, 284 N.E.2d 159, 159, 333 N.Y.S.2d 175, 176 (1972).
I0" Smith v. LaGuardia, 268 N.Y. 632, 633, 198 N.E. 529, 530 (1935); Maryland Cas. Co.
v. John A. Roebling's Sons Co., 266 N.Y. 610, 610, 195 N.E. 223, 223 (1935). But cf. Sybron
Corp. v. Wetzel, 46 N.Y.2d 197, 201, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 1056, 413 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128 (1978)
(appeal from so much of appellate division order as denied injunction affirmed on ground
that the court of appeals could not review same; court did not dismiss that portion of appeal
for want of finality).
Orders denying or granting preliminary injunctions may, however, be appealed with the

permission of the appellate division. See Barclay's Ice Cream Co. v. Local 7579, Ice Cream
Drivers, 41 N.Y.2d 269, 271, 360 N.E.2d 956, 957, 392 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (1977).
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such decree may be regarded as final. This is the holding of In re
North Hempstead Turnpike, Nassau County,104 wherein the petitioner recovered a condemnation award, and the lower courts directed the county attorney to apply to the board of supervisors for
authority to submit a tentative decree to enforce the award. The
court of appeals held the order was final, since it was "well outside
the scope of the condemnation proceeding" and was, in fact, relief
10 5
granted in a "separate proceeding.'

The holding in North Hempstead Turnpike is in accord with
a long line of more familiar decisions in which the court of appeals
has accepted jurisdiction or appellate division determinations that
granted or denied writs or prohibition. 08 Writs of prohibition have
been sought in efforts to prevent courts or district attorneys from
proceeding with the prosecution of a criminal action in a manner
which the defendant claims is in excess of their jurisdiction.10 7 Although the right to appeal in criminal matters is carefully-and
narrowly-regulated by statute for the expressed purpose of avoiding "protracted and multifarious appeals and collateral proceedings, ' ' 08 applications for writs of prohibition are separate proceedings, 10 9 independent from the underlying criminal action.
Accordingly, orders granting or denying such writs are generally
regarded as finally determining independent proceedings. 110
Finality problems are frequently encountered in connection
with appeals from orders made on applications to stay or to compel arbitration. Typically, whether a particular dispute must be
submitted to arbitration is presented either by way of an application to stay or to compel arbitration." Both applications are pro16 N.Y.2d 105, 209 N.E.2d 785, 262 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1965).
101 Id. at 110, 209 N.E.2d at 787, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
106 See, e.g., Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 8, 351 N.E.2d 650, 386 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1976); La104

Rocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 338 N.E.2d 606, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 968 (1976); Abraham v. Justices of the New York Supreme Court, 37 N.Y.2d 560, 338
N.E.2d 537, 376 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975).
107 See cases cited at note 106 supra.
'08 State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 63, 324 N.E.2d 351, 354, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879, 882 (1975).
See generally Note, The Writ of Prohibitionin New York-Attempt to Circumscribe An
Elusive Concept, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 76 (1975).
109 See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7801 (McKinney 1963). An application for a writ of prohibition must be made by a special proceeding commenced pursuant to article 78 of the
CPLR. Id.
110 H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 31, at 128; cf. D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 527, at 727 (1978) (special proceeding determining "arbitrability" is independent,
hence disposition is final).

"' See generally D.

SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE

§ 592 (1978).
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vided for and are governed by article 75 of the CPLR, 112 and both
constitute independent special proceedings. Indeed, such applications are commonly made at a time when the dispute is not yet the
subject of civil litigation. The court of appeals has consistently
held that "an order of the Appellate Division directing arbitration
or denying a stay of arbitration is deemed final and appealable as
such to this court. '" 3
This rule is sound both in theory and as a matter of practicality. In theory, the application pursuant to article 75 is entirely independent from a civil action, which in all likelihood has not yet
been commenced. An order that resolves the application determines once and for all whether the parties should arbitrate their
dispute. As a matter of practicality, it is useful to settle finally the
arbitration issue by obtaining a court of appeals ruling before the
parties and the courts are required to expend" time, effort, and
money to litigate a dispute that may not properly be the subject of
a litigation.
An interesting body of case law exists, however, in situations
where an application to compel arbitration is made, not independently pursuant to article 75 of the CPLR, but by way of a motion
in a pending action. The general rule is that where a motion is
made to stay an action pending arbitration, the order is not final if
the motion is made in the court in which the action is pending and
the application bears the same captions as the action itself.1 4 In
1967, the court of appeals, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner &
Smith, Inc. v. Griesenbeck,1 1 5 overruling some earlier cases, held
that orders which compel arbitration, as opposed to orders which
merely stay actions pending arbitration, are final. In Merrill
Lynch, a defendant in a civil action moved to dismiss the complaint and sought an order directing the plaintiff to proceed to arbitration. The appellate division entered an order which refused
dismissal of the complaint but which directed the parties to arbi112 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW

§ 7503 (McKinney 1963).
Wilaka Constr. Co. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 17 N.Y.2d 195, 204, 216 N.E.2d
696, 700, 269 N.Y.S.2d 697, 703 (1966) (citations omitted); accord, Associated Metals &
Minerals Corp. v. Kemikalija, 10 N.Y.2d 298, 300-01, 178 N.E.2d 715, 716, 222 N.Y.S.2d 313,
314-15 (1961); see H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 31, at 129 n.11. A disposition
denying arbitration and retaining the case in court may be final "if the disposition about
arbitrability is made in a special proceeding, as most such dispositions are, instead of in the
context of an action." D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 527, at 727 (1978).
114 See H. COHEN & A. KARGER,supra note 1, § 31, at 129 n.11 and cases cited therein.
'" 21 N.Y.2d 688, 690, 234 N.E.2d 456, 456-57, 287 N.Y.S.2d 419, 419-20 (1967).
113
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trate. 116 The court of appeals concluded that the appellate division
order was a "final order in a special proceeding" and that "[t]he
mere fact that this order was made on a motion in a pending ac'117
tion does not impair its finality.
Approximately 2 years later, the court indicated that the exception made in Merrill Lynch with respect to orders compelling
arbitration did not subsume the general rule that orders staying
actions pending arbitration are non-final. In Kushlin v. Bialer,1 8
the defendants moved to stay a pending action and to compel arbitration. Special term granted the motion, ordering that the action
be stayed pending arbitration. The appellate division affirmed, 11 9
one justice dissenting. 120 The defendants, on the basis of the dissent, took an appeal as of right to the court of appeals. The court
dismissed the appeal for want of finality. 21 The court stated that
"the order, entered in the action itself, staying such action pending
arbitration, does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.' ' 22 As authority, the court cited a case decided prior to Merrill Lynch as well as a footnote in the Cohen &
Karger treatise which describes the general rule. 23 The court appears to have distinguished Merrill Lynch on the ground that, in
Kushlin, all that was involved was an order staying the action and
to have applied the general rule that stay orders are not ordinarily
orders that finally determine the action. 2 Seemingly, the difference between Kushlin and Merrill Lynch is that in Merrill Lynch
the parties were actually directed to arbitrate, whereas in Kushlin
the action was merely stayed pending arbitration. In at least one
subsequent decision the court has adhered to Kushlin. 25 More recently, however, in Clurman v. Clurman, 26 the court, citing Mer:16 28 App. Div. 2d 99, 104, 281 N.Y.S.2d 580, 585 (1st Dep't 1967).
"

21 N.Y.2d at 690, 234 N.E.2d at 457, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 419.

18 26 N.Y.2d 748, 257 N.E.2d 293, 309 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1970).
19 32 App. Div. 2d 217, 217-18, 301 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (1st Dep't 1969).
12 Id. at 218-21, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 183-86 (Nunez, J., dissenting).

26 N.Y.2d at 748, 257 N.E.2d at 294, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
Id. at 748, 257 N.E.2d at 294, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
123Id. (citing American Reserve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 298 N.Y. 915, 85 N.E.2d 59
12-

.22

(1949); H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 31, at 129 n.11).
124 26 N.Y.2d at 748, 257 N.E.2d at 294, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 48. The court made a "cf."
citation to Merrill Lynch without setting forth an express ground for distinguishing Kushlin
from Merrill Lynch.
12
Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 33 N.Y.2d 632, 301 N.E.2d 551, 347 N.Y.S.2d 583
(1973).
12 N.Y.L.J., April 7, 1980, at 11, col. 5. The court stated that the order finally deter-
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rill Lynch, held that an order that denied a within-an-action motion to compel arbitration to be final.
The general rule adhered to in Kushlin would appear to stand
upon a stronger theoretical base than the exception made in Merrill Lynch. Since the application for abritration is made within an
existing action, there appears to be no basis for the claim made by
the Merrill Lynch court and reiterated in Clurman that the order
'127
compelling arbitration is a "final order in a special proceeding,

particularly since the movant in Merrill Lynch could not have
properly commenced a special proceeding. 1 28 Moreover, if the application to compel arbitration is granted and the action stayed, it
is clear that the action has not been finally determined, and the
theory underlying Kushlin should be applied. The action would
become final only after an arbitration award is made and confirmed 129 and the action dismissed or disposed of as barred by the
award. 30 Similarly, if the motion to compel arbitration and to stay
the action is denied, that order should also be technically non-final
since the issues in the action would not have been finally
determined.
While the Kushlin rule is technically sound, the rule does have
some practical disadvantages. If the order stays the action pending
arbitration, the parties may be relegated to engage in an arbitration proceeding that the court of appeals later may conclude was
not proper.' 31 This practical concern appears to be at the root of
the Merrill Lynch decision. On the other hand, if the order denies
the stay pending arbitration, the parties may be forced to litigate,
and the courts forced to determine, a dispute that the court of appeals may later hold to be arbitrable.13 2 Thus, whether the motion

to stay the action is granted or denied, the parties may have to
engage in an unnecessary proceeding, and the determination of the
mined "a separate special proceeding."
127 21 N.Y.2d at 690, 234 N.E.2d at 456-57, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
128CPLR 7503(c) specifically states that "[i]f an issue claimed to be arbitrable is involved in an action pending in a Court having jurisdiction to hear a motion to compel arbitration, the application shall be made by motion in that action." N.Y. Cry. PRAc. LAW §
7503(c) (McKinney 1978).
See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 7510, 7511 (McKinney 1978).
See id. § 3211(a)(5) (1978).
x, The issue of arbitration might be presented to the court on an appeal from an order
'

150

or judgment that disposed of the action as barred by the result in the arbitration.
132The issue of arbitration might be raised on appeal from an order or judgment that
determines the merits of the action.
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merits of the controversy may be delayed if, on a later appeal, the
court of appeals finds that the conclusion reached on the threshold
issue of arbitration was erroneous. Nevertheless, the present rule
appears to be that orders which actually compel arbitration are
final, but orders which merely stay the action pending arbitration
are non-final. 3 ' This distinction appears to be highly technical and
worthy of reassessment.
One further point should be noted in connection with finality
of orders made on arbitration applications. The court of appeals
has held that a motion made to disqualify an arbitrator is a final
order. 3 4 The holding is notable in that there is no statute expressly authorizing pre-arbitration hearing motions, addressed to a
court, to disqualify arbitrators. 135 Since the court of appeals has
held that courts have inherent authority to entertain such applications,3 6 it is apparent that, despite the lack of express statutory
authority, the applications are to be made as special proceedings.
A determination to grant or deny the the application is therefore a
final determination of a special proceeding.
There are other frequently encountered pre-trial rulings that
should be mentioned. Article 9 of the CPLR requires a plaintiff
suing on behalf of a class to move for an order to determine
whether the action may proceed as a class action. 137 The court of
appeals has squarely ruled that appellate division orders granting
or denying class action status are non-final.3 8
"33 In addition to Clurman, there is at least one other case that appears to follow Merrill Lynch. In In re Allcity Ins. Co., 66 App. Div. 2d 531, 413 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1st Dep't 1979),
the appellate division affirmed an order which denied a within-an-action motion to compel
arbitration. The court of appeals, in determining to dismiss the motion for leave to appeal
in part and to deny the motion in part, implicitly treated the denial of arbitration by the
appellate division as final. 48 N.Y.2d 629, 396 N.E.2d 474, 421 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979).
'31 Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 132,
182 N.E.2d 85, 86, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (1962).
13 Siegel v. Lewis, 40 N.Y.2d 687, 689, 358 N.E.2d 484, 485, 389 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801

(1976).
136 Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 11 N.Y.2d 128, 132,
182 N.E.2d 85, 86, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (1962).
"37

N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 902 (McKinney 1976).

Rosenfield v. A. H. Robins Co., 46 N.Y.2d 731, 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 1301, 413
N.Y.S.2d 374, 374 (1978). The court in Rosenfield also held that such orders cannot be
appealed even where permission of the appellate division is obtained, since such orders do
not raise questions of law. Id.
The refusal of the court of appeals to hold orders granting or denying class action status
to be final is similar to the practice now followed by the federal courts. At one time, several
federal appellate courts, including the Second Circuit, held that orders denying class action
status were appealable as final orders since such a ruling may have the practical economic
138
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Orders to compel disclosure and protective orders to prevent
disclosure are generally non-final in nature.1 39 A major caveat concerns orders granting or denying applications to quash subpeonas
issued in criminal actions or proceedings. The court of appeals has
consistently held that such orders are "final orders in special proceedings on the civil side of a court vested with civil jurisdiction. ' 140 This rule is similar in theory to the rule holding that orders directing or denying stays of arbitration are final orders. 41
The court, however, has not been inclined to broaden the criminal
subpoena rule so as to encourage other appeals
from essentially
142
non-final determinations in criminal actions.
Another frequently encountered type of determination is an
order that decides a motion for summary judgment. 14 3 Here, finalsignificance of ringing the "death knell" of the action. E.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1235 (1967). In 1978, however, the United States Supreme Court in
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), unanimously rejected the "death knell"
doctrine and held that such orders are not appealable to the circuit court of appeals as of
right. The Court stated that the "incremental benefit" afforded a few litigants by the "death
knell" doctrine is "outweighed by the impact of such an individualized jurisdictional inquiry
on the judicial system's overall capacity to administer justice." Id. at 473.
It should be noted that the New York Court of Appeals apparently has never published
an opinion in which the court has adopted the "death knell" doctrine in any form. The
chances of the court so doing in any given situation are reduced by the unanimous rejection
of the doctrine by the United States Supreme Court. It would appear to be beyond a proper
exercise of the judicial function for the court to hold that finality issues must turn upon the
court's assessment of the economic impact of the orders made below.
1S0E.g., Beuschel v. Manowitz, 265 N.Y. 509, 193 N.E. 295 (1934) (order granting physical examination not final); see H. CoHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 38, at 156.
140 Cunningham v. Nadjari, 39 N.Y.2d 314, 317, 347 N.E.2d 915, 916, 383 N.Y.S.2d 590,
591, (1976) (per curiam); accord, Boikess v. Aspland, 24 N.Y.2d 136, 138-39, 247 N.E.2d 135,
136, 299 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165 (1969).
" See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
14'See, e.g., People v. Santangello, 38 N.Y.2d 536, 539, 344 N.E.2d 404, 406, 381
N.Y.S.2d 472, 473-74 (1976). The Santangellocourt held that an order granting the application of a grand jury witness for disclosure of electronic surveillance records and granting the
application to determine whether such surveillance was used to prepare questioning is nonfinal. The court distinguished the subpoena cases on the ground that
[a] motion to quash is limited in scope, challenging only the validity of the subpoena or the jurisdiction of the issuing authority ... and should be made prior to
the return date, thereby requiring such timeliness that substantial delay in the
proceedings is unlikely ... Moreover, where granted, it results in completely
voiding the process ...
thus saving the needless expenditure of litigation effort.
38 N.Y.2d at 539, 344 N.E.2d at 405-06, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 473 (citations and footnote omitted). The court noted that the application made in Santangello, in contrast, raised neither a
jurisdictional noi a process objection, possessed potential for delay and could not dispose of
any portion of the investigation. Id.
143 See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 3212 (McKinney 1970).
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ity hinges upon the result. If the motion for summary judgment is
granted, thereby disposing of a distinct portion of the action, the
order is finale"' If the motion for
summary judgment is denied,
14 5
however, the order is non-final.
In the matrimonial sphere, it should be noted that applications for pendents lite relief, such as temporary alimony and coun46
sel fees, are generally regarded as non-final.1
Judgments and Post-trial Orders
The clearest type of final order is one from the appellate division that determines both liability and the relief to be assessed in
favor of the prevailing party. Thus, an appellate division order that
affirms a judgment in favor of one party and against another for a
specified sum is clearly final. Of course, the order need not authorize judgment for a specified sum to be final; declaratory judgment
orders are final if the judgment fully declares the rights of the
147
parties.
Orders that determine liability only, leaving the assessment of
damages open for further judicial proceedings, are generally nonfinal."48 This rule is not absolute, however. Under the principle of
144 See Created Gemstones, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 47 N.Y.2d 250, 254, 391
N.E.2d 987, 989, 417 N.Y.S.2d 905, 906 (1979) (grant of partial summary judgment to defendant implicitly held final); see also notes 163-207 and accompanying text infra (discussing
the doctrine of implied severance).
145 See, e.g., Health Ins. Ass'n of America v. Harnett, 44 N.Y.2d 302, 314,
376 N.E.2d
1280, 1287, 405 N.Y.S. 2d 634, 641 (1978); Alkow v. Richmond, 32 N.Y.2d 831, 831, 299
N.E.2d 260, 260, 345 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 1017 (1973); Bachrach v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 748, 749, 284 N.E.2d 157, 158, 333 N.Y.S.2d 174, 174 (1972); Northern Operating
Corp. v. Town of Rampo, 26 N.Y.2d 404, 410-11, 259 N.E.2d 723, 727, 311 N.Y.S.2d 286, 291
(1970).
146 See, e.g., Hunt v. Hunt, 48 N:Y.2d 654, - N.Y.S.2d (1979) (interim counsel fees);
Weinberg v. Weinberg, 48 N.Y.2d 655, - N.Y.S.2d - (1979) (temporary alimony); H. CoHEN
& A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 38, at 156 & n.96.
147 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 35 N.Y.2d 587, 590, 324
N.E.2d 137, 138, 364 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484, reo'g 43 App. Div. 2d 314, 351 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2d
Dep't 1974).
148 E.g., Lincoln Steel Prods., Inc. v. Schuster, 38 N.Y.2d 738, 343 N.E.2d 759, 381
N.Y.S.2d 41 (1975); James v. Powell, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 256 n.3, 225 N.E.2d 741, 744 n.3, 279
N.Y.S.2d 10, 15 n.3 (1967) (order striking defendant's answer and directing inquest on damages); Schering Corp. v. Zonana, 15 N.Y.2d 852, 205 N.E.2d 879, 257 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1965)
(order affirming judgment in favor of plaintiff and appointing referee to hear assessment of
damages); Sinram-Marnis Oil Co. v. Reading-Sinram-Streat-Coals, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 726, 148
N.E.2d 321, 171 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1958) (order granting injunction and directing an accounting); Alexanders Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Orbach's, 291 N.Y. 707, 52 N.E.2d 595, (1943) (order
granting injunction and appointing referee to compute damages); McAlster v. Chin Lee Co.,
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"irreparable injury," an interlocutory judgment, which fixes liability but leaves damages to be determined, "is final for purposes of
appeal to the extent that it directs an immediate irrevocable
change of position by one of the parties, or orders action which will
cause immediate irreparable injury to one of them."u 9 An example
of this type of situation is an order that fixes liability and directs
an accounting but directs the liable party to immediately turn over
property in his possession.
An order of the appellate division which reverses a judgment
and orders a new trial is also non-final; 150 the parties must retry
the case and appeal from the outcome of the second trial.151
A slightly different situation is confronted where a party's successful motion in the trial court for a new trial is reversed by the
appellate division. The court of appeals has held that appellate division orders that reverse grants of new trials are not final. 152 In
such cases, the appellant's remedy is either to obtain leave to appeal from the appellate division or to pursue an appeal from the
judgment entered upon the result of the first trial.153 There is one
caveat, however. Since the appellant does not lose his opportunity
for a second trial until the appellate division rules on the appeal
from the new trial order of the trial court, the time within which to
take an appeal from the judgment entered on the first trial may
elapse. Attorneys who move for a new trial, therefore, should also
be sure to notice an appeal from the judgment entered after the
first trial, lest the opportunity to appeal that judgment be lost after the refusal of an application for a new trial.
There is a point of comparison between the cases holding that
orders directing new trials are not final and cases holding that orders leaving damage issues open for judicial determination are not
final. Both lines of cases demonstrate that if further judicial consideration at the trial level is needed to complete the case, the case
266 N.Y. 603, 195 N.E. 220, (1935) (order granting summary judgment to plaintiff, striking
answers and directing trial as to damages).

119H.

COHEN

& A.

KARGER,

supra note 1, § 17, at 72.

1"9See, e.g., Aridas v. Caserta, 41 N.Y.2d 1059, 1060, 364 N.E.2d 835, 836, 396 N.Y.S.2d
170, 171-72 (1977); Alpert v. Finkelstein, 33 N.Y.2d 651, 651, 303 N.E.2d 703, 703, 348
N.Y.S.2d 977, 977 (1973); Cascia v. Maze Woodenware Co., 22 N.Y.2d 872, 872, 239 N.E.2d
917, 917, 293 N.Y.S.2d 332, 332 (1968).
"5 See.H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, § 11, at 42.
I52 Gamell v: Mount Sinai Hospital, 32 N.Y.2d 678, 296 N.E.2d 256, 343 N.Y.S.2d 359
(1973).
U 3 See

H.

COHEN

& A.

KARGER,

supra note 1, § 10, at 40.
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is not yet ripe for review by the court of appeals. This is subject to
qualification, however. If the work to be done below is ministerial
in nature, such as where only arithmetic computations are involved, the order may be considered final.15 4 Moreover, the remittal for further proceedings must be to a court or to a state administrative agency; a remittal to entities outside the court system or
outside the system of state administrative agencies is
insufficient. 155
The recent decision of the court of appeals in Sofair v. State
University of New York Upstate Medical Center College of
Medicine 56 aptly illustrates this point. In Sofair, a medical student brought an article 78 proceeding which sought an order directing the medical school to reinstate him and to award him a
medical degree. Special term dismissed the petition, but the appellate division reversed, concluding that the student had been denied
procedural due process and that the medical school must hold a
new hearing. The school appealed to the court of appeals, and the
student sought to dismiss the appeal as being from a non-final order, pointing to the fact that the appellate division had "remitted"
the case back to the school for a further hearing. The court of appeals rejected this contention and retained jurisdiction.
The so-called "remittal", however, was not within the judicial
system or to an administrative agency of the state .... Any judicial review of the new determination to be made by the College of
Medicine following the mandated hearing could only be had in a
new, second article 78 proceeding; the present proceeding could
not be revived as a procedural vehicle for such review. Accordingly, the disposition of the Appellate Division finally determined
157
the present proceeding within the meaning of the Constitution.
Thus, Sofair demonstrates two key points: the remittal must
be to a court or state agency, and the order should be considered
final if the actions taken upon the remittal cannot be reviewed
within the context of a pending proceeding.
A motion commonly encountered is one to vacate an order or
judgment entered upon a default. The court of appeals has consistently held that if the order of the appellate division denies the moH. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note 1, §
155 See H. COHEN & A. KARGER, supra note
154

1

11, at 47-49.
1, § 11.
44 N.Y.2d 475, 377 N.E.2d 730, 406 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1978).
Id. at 479, 377 N.E.2d at 731, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 277 (citations omitted).
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tion to vacate, the order is non-final. 51 8 The rationale for this rule
is that a denial of a motion to vacate a prior judgment "neither
adds to nor detracts from the rights of the parties as determined
by such judgment-it merely adheres to the already final determination."1 59 An order that grants the motion to vacate logically
should be considered non-final as well, since, upon the grant of the
vacatur, the prior judgment is lifted and the rights of the parties
must be determined anew.
Occasionally, a practitioner may attempt to appeal from an order of the appellate division issued in the course of administering
the appeal. Such attempts have been uniformly rejected as nonfinal. Thus, an order denying a motion to consolidate a cross appeal with the main appeal, e0 an order denying a stay pending appeal, 8 1 and an order of the appellate division denying162reargument
and denying leave for a further appeal are not final.
FINALITY: IMPLIED SEVERANCE

o

Particularly difficult finality problems arise in multiple claim
situations. In a given case, for example, the order of the appellate
division may finally determine only one of several causes of action
or only a main claim but not a counter-claim or cross-claim. Appellate counsel who seek immediate court of appeals review may be
met with a dismissal on the grounds that the order below was not
final since it decided only a portion of the claims.163
18 See, e.g., In re Dietz, 29 N.Y.2d 915, 279 N.E.2d 607, 328 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1972); Presti
v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.2d 928, 193 N.E.2d 897, 244 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1963).
" People v. Scanlon, 6 N.Y.2d 185, 187-88, 160 N.E.2d 453, 454, 189 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144
(1959) (per curiam).
160 Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 157, 187 N.E.2d 777, 779, 237 N.Y.S.2d
319, 322 (1962).
6I Brenner v. Brenner, 48 N.Y.2d 713, 397 N.E.2d 1182, 422 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979).
1'62Polakoff v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 714, 397 N.E.2d 1182, 422
N.Y.S.2d 378 (1979); In re Sauerbrun, 48 N.Y.2d 635, 421 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1979).
"" See 7 WK&M, supra note 2, 1 5611.03. Concern has been expressed regarding the
effect of an erroneous decision by counsel not to take advantage of the concept of implied
severance. It has been theorized that a practitioner who does not take an appeal, after concluding that an order is not final, may become ensnarled in a procedural trap if the court of
appeals later finds that the order was final, thus barring an appeal from a later order. Cf. In
re Hillowitz, 20 N.Y.2d 952, 233 N.E.2d 719, 286 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1967) (court rejected an
attempt to use implied severance as a sword rather than as a shield). Hillowitz is discussed
in notes 176-178 and accompanying text infra. There is no reported decision, however, in
which the court has permitted the use of a doctrine devised as a means for preserving an
appeal as a justification for barring a later appeal. It would therefore seem unlikely that the
court would permit this salutory doctrine to be used in such a fashion.
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At one time, the court took the position that an order finally
determining fewer than all causes of action in a complaint was not
final unless the finally determined causes of action were officially
and expressly severed from the remaining causes of action.'"
In 1949, however, the court recognized the concept of implied
severance. In New York Trap Rock Corp. v. Town of Clarkstown, 6 5 the plaintiff brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of a local building zone ordinance.
Defendants, the town and several local officials, counterclaimed for
an injunction against plaintiff's continued operation of a nuisance.
On an appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss the counterclaim, the appellate division held that defendants lacked the legal capacity to maintain the counterclaim. Defendants appealed to
the court of appeals, thereby setting the stage for an important
pronouncement on finality in the context of cases involving multiple claims.
The court of appeals retained jurisdiction of the appeal, reasoning that the counterclaim was "in effect a separate and distinct
action brought by defendants against plaintiff."1 6' 6 When the appellate division ordered the counterclaim dismissed, it necessarily
"impliedly severed it from the action, which still is pending unde67
termined, and to that extent is final.'1
The concept of "implied severance" enunciated in New York
Trap Rock was later broadened to cover situations involving the
dismissal of fewer than all causes of action asserted in a single
pleading. Initially, this expansion was accomplished without discussion of the jurisdictional principle involved.1 68 Then, in 1967,
164 See Davis v. Cohn, 286 N.Y. 622, 36 N.E.2d 458 (1941); accord, Cage v. Rosenberg,
271 N.Y. 509, 2 N.E.2d 670 (1936). Even under a rule requiring express severance, the court
accepted jurisdiction of cases where a complaint was finally determined although a counterclaim remained pending. See Reichel v. Standard Rice Co., 254 N.Y. 86, 171 N.E. 916
(1930). Moreover, there is authority to the effect that the rule pronounced in Davis was not
uniformly applied by the court either before or after Davis. See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 5601,
commentary at 326-27 (McKinney Supp. 1968); Corash v. Texas Co., 178 Misc. 1059, 106061, 37 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942).
:65 299 N.Y. 77, 85 N.E.2d 873 (1949).
166 Id. at 80, 85 N.E.2d at 875.
167

Id.

See Denker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 10 N.Y.2d 339, 179 N.E.2d 336,
223 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1961) (order below dismissed one of two causes of action); Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (order below
dismissed one of three causes of action); Ingraham v. Anderson, 2 N.Y.2d 820, 140 N.E.2d
747, 159 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1957) (order below dismissed one of two causes of action). Moreover,
in several cases the court followed New York Trap Rock by retaining jurisdiction of orders
'68
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the court of appeals articulated the basis for the expansion in a
case whose facts were well within New York Trap Rock.
In Sirlin Plumbing v. Maple Hill Homes, Inc.,169 the plaintiff
brought an action to recover the balance due for plumbing services,
and the defendant set up an affirmative defense and counterclaim
based upon alleged overcharges. 170 Several of the alleged
overcharges involved transactions referred to in the complaint. The
appellate division, reversing special term, granted the plaintiff's
motion to dismiss the affirmative defense and counterclaim.1 71
When the defendant appealed to the court of appeals, the plaintiff
moved to dismiss the appeal for want of finality.
The court denied the motion. In a per curiam opinion which
quoted New York Trap Rock, the court held that the determination of the appellate division, insofar as it dismissed the counterclaim, impliedly severed it from the still pending action and thus
was final to that extent. "2 Although this was all that was strictly
necessary to its determination to retain jurisdiction under the
facts, the court went on to state the general rule regarding the concept of implied severance:
It is on the same theory of implied severance that a determination dismissing one of several causes of action in a complaint is to
that extent held final, although the other causes of action have
not yet been determined.... Some of our early decisions suggested that this doctrine of severance was of limited availability
and was inapplicable where there were common issues and a close
interrelationship between the claim that was dismissed and the
claims still pending ....
However, our more recent decisions reflect a pronounced trend away from that approach. These later
decisions have thus consistently upheld as final determinations
such as that in this case, dismissing but one of several causes of
action or a counterclaim alone, even though the claim that has
been disposed of involves the same transaction as the claims re1
maining undetermined and is directly related thereto. 71
that finally determined only one of the pleadings in the case. See Janos v. Peck, 15 N.Y.2d
509, 202 N.E.2d 560, 254 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1964); Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215,
149 N.E.2d 869, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1958).
6-' 20 N.Y.2d 401, 230 N.E.2d 394, 283 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1967) (per curiam).
170Id. at 402, 230 N.E.2d at 394, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 489-90.
171 Id. at 403, 230 N.E.2d at 395, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
172 Id. at 402, 230 N.E.2d at 394, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
17I Id. at 402-03, 230 N.E.2d at 394-95, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 490 (citations omitted). Sirlin is
an unusual decision not only because of its broad holding but also because the court issued a
per curian opinion in ruling on a pre-argument motion to dismiss the appeal; such motions
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In other words, the court in Sirlin broadly decreed that orders
below which finally determine only one cause of action asserted in
any pleading could be deemed "final" under the doctrine of "implied severance," even though a large portion, if not most, of the
overall action remained pending.
Although Sirlin proclaimed that finality ordinarily would not
be affected by the fact that both the non-final claims and the
finally determined claims arose out of the same transactions, the
court left open the possibility that an order
involving extremely
17 4
closely related claims might be non-final.

Shortly after the Sirlin decision, the court further expanded
the doctrine of implied severance. In Kelly v. Bremmerman,17 5 the
court ruled that where a pleading asserts only one cause of action,
but the order below treats the single cause of action as involving
two or more distinct claims and finally determines one of those
claims, the finally determined claim would be deemed impliedly
1 76
severed from the balance of the still pending cause of action.
Thus, implied severance would be applied not only to "sever" distinct causes of action contained in one or more pleadings, 17 7 it also

would "sever" claims within a single cause of action.
During the same year, however, the court of appeals imposed
ordinarily do not generate a detailed writing from the court. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra.
14
Id. at 403, 230 N.E.2d at 395, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 490. Foreshadowing its later decision
in Behren v. Papworth, 30 N.Y.2d 532, 281 N.E.2d 178, 330 N.Y.S.2d 381(1972), the court
added: "We need not decide whether the rationale of our earlier decisions may yet be apposite in some exceptional situations involving an extremely close interrelationship between
the respective claims. It is sufficient to note that no such situation is here presented." 20
N.Y.2d at 403, 230 N.E.2d at 395, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
" 21 N.Y.2d 195, 234 N.E.2d 217, 287 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).
27 Id. at 202, 234 N.E.2d at 220, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 45. In Kelly, the plaintiff asserted a
single cause of action for recovery of an assessment due on two insurance policies. The order
below granted judgment to the defendant on one of the policies but directed a trial with
respect to the other. The court of appeals noted that while the two claims were related,
there was an important distinction in that the policies had different expiration dates. Id.
17 See, e.g., Rose v. Bailey, 28 N.Y.2d 857, 271 N.E.2d 230, 322 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1971). In
Rose, the court, although dismissing an appeal as of right, on other grounds held that in a
negligence action, an order which finally determined plaintiffs' causes of action for personal
injury and loss of consortium should be deemed impliedly severed from a still pending counterclaim for property damage. Id. at 858, 271 N.E.2d at 230, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 252. The court
nevertheless later refused to apply the concept of implied severance in a divorce action
where the appellate division concluded that neither party had proved a cause of action for
divorce. It therefore remitted the case to the trial court for an assessment of support due
the wife. Schine v. Schine, 28 N.Y.2d 928, 271 N.E.2d 703, 323 N.Y.S.2d 175, motion to
reinstate appeal denied, 28 N.Y.2d 993, 272 N.E.2d 343, 323 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1971).
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an important limitation on the concept of implied severance. Interestingly, the case before the court, In re Hillowitz,1 7 8 involved an
attempt to use the concept as a sword to dispose of an appeal,
rather than as an effort to justify it. In Hillowitz, an appellate division order directed the grant of a petition brought by an executor
to transfer to him certain property in possession of the decedent's
widow. On appeal to the court of appeals, the widow sought review
of a prior order of the appellate division1 79 that had rejected one of
her defenses to the petition. The executor moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the prior order itself was a final determination of a severable claim asserted by the widow.
The court of appeals rejected this contention, holding that the
theory of implied severance as expounded in Sirlin is applicable
only where there has been a final determination of a distinct cause
of action or part thereof. Implied severance, the court declared, has
no application where, as in Hillowitz, the appellate division merely
settles some of the issues involved in a single cause of action.1 80
In 1972, the court began to retrench somewhat from the broad
rule declared in Sirlin. In Behren v. Papworth,181 the court addressed the question, left open in Sirlin, of "exceptional situations
involving an extremely close interrelationship between the respective claims. ' 1 8 2 In Behren, the complaint alleged nine separate
causes of action based upon an alleged oral joint venture agreement. Special term dismissed each of them, but the appellate division reinstated three of the nine. The plaintiff thereafter appealed
from so much of the appellate division order as affirmed the dismissal of one of six other causes of action. s
Dismissing the appeal for want of finality, the court noted that
the dismissed cause of action was predicated on the same joint
venture agreement and upon the same alleged breach of the agreement as was one of the causes of action reinstated by the appellate
178
178

20 N.Y.2d 952, 233 N.E.2d 719, 286 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1967).
For a discussion of an appeal from a prior order of the appellate division which has

become final see notes 207 & 210 and accompanying text infra.
18020 N.Y.2d at 953-54, 233 N.E.2d at 720, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
18- 30 N.Y.2d 532, 281 N.E.2d 178, 330 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1972)(per curiam).
182 20 N.Y.2d at 403, 230 N.E.2d at 395, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
18330 N.Y.2d at 533, 281 N.E.2d at 178, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 382. Defendants sought to
appeal so much of the appellate division order as reinstated three causes of action. This
appeal, involving the denial of the motion to dismiss causes of action, was held to be from
an order that was clearly non-final and thus was dismissed. Id. at 534, 281 N.E.2d at 179,
330 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
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division. Indeed, the reinstated cause sought as relief an accounting of profits from the alleged joint venture, while the cause under
consideration, which repeated the allegations of the first, sought
damages based upon the shares of stock the plaintiffs were to receive under the same agreement. The court held that the two
causes of action "comprise, in essence, nothing more than a single
cause of action in which merely alternative forms of relief for the
'184
individual defendant's breach of a single agreement are sought.

Accordingly, the appellate division order only settled "some of the
issues involved in a single cause of action" and did not "make a
'
final disposition of a separate and distinct cause of action."185
Thus, in Behren, the court concluded that the "general rule"
of Sirlin was inapplicable where there is an "extremely close interrelationship between the respective claims." 188 Behren further
demonstrates that the court is not required to follow the numbering of causes of action made by the draftsman of the pleadings.
The court could and did pierce the formal veil of separate numbering to determine that, for finality purposes, only one basic cause of
action existed.
The Behren analysis was subsequently applied to a case involving a final order on a complaint that left an affirmative defense
and counterclaim unresolved. 18 7 There, the order of the appellate
division affirmed a judgment which held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover a specified sum from the defendant under a construction contract. Although the judgment left the sum subject to
reduction if the defendant prevailed on an affirmative defense, it
also provided for the dismissal of defendant's counterclaim based
on performance of the work. The court of appeals dismissed the
defendant's appeal from the appellate division order. Not only did
the judgment leave open the issue of damages, but the dismissed
counterclaim was dependently related to the main cause of action,
and thus, "the main cause of action which was left open for further
adjudication was inextricably related to the counterclaim."' 188
Similarly, where the parties had brought separate but consoli--I Id. at 534, 281 N.E.2d at 179, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
285

Id.

at 534, 281 N.E.2d at 179, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 383-84 (quoting In re Hillowitz, 20

N.Y.2d 952, 954, 233 N.E.2d 719, 720, 286 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (1967)).
:86 30 N.Y.2d at 523, 281 N.E.2d at 179, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
17 Mama Constr. Corp. v. Town of Huntington, 31 N.Y.2d 854, 292 N.E.2d 307, 340
N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
188 Id. at 855, 292 N.E.2d at 308, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 167.
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dated actions against each other arising out of the same transaction, and the appellate division order finally determined only one
of the actions, the court has declined to imply a severance of the
actions.189 In such cases, the court has reasoned that the issues are
so closely related as to indicate that the result in one of the actions
might predetermine the result in the other on the identical
record.190
In 1975, the court of appeals again had occasion to consider
the applicability of the exception noted in Sirlin and followed in
Behren. In Lizza Industries, Inc. v. Long Island Lighting Co.,191 a
public contractor brought suit against a utility to recover the costs
incurred in protecting the utility's installations during a construction project. The utility counterclaimed for damages to the installations and for the cost of relocating several power lines. The appellate division order directed the dismissal of one of plaintiff's
three causes of action and granted defendant summary judgment
solely on the issue of liability on two of four counterclaims. When
plaintiff took an appeal to the court of appeals from this order, the
court dismissed the appeal for lack of finality. The Lizza court
ruled that the concept of implied severance was not applicable
since the finally determined cause of action, i.e., the single disgivmissed cause of action, was "not discrete from the transactions
'192
ing rise to counterclaims which are not finally determined.

In Lizza the court seemed to be both applying the narrow exception made in Sirlin and Behren, previously applicable in extraordinary cases where the respective claims are extremely closely
related, and indicating that the narrow exception may be more
generally applied. Indeed, Lizza, unlike Behren, was not a case
where one cause of action was disguised as two. The plaintiff's
cause of action was plainly different from the defendants' counterclaims. Lizza was far more similar to Sirlin, since in Sirlin both
the complaint and the counterclaim were based upon at least some
of the same transactions.193 Thus, it appeared that the court had,
in effect, abandoned Sirlin in favor of the narrower rule pro,81Epstein v. Paganne, Ltd., 34 N.Y.2d 855, 316 N.E.2d 350, 359 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1974),
dismissing appeal from 44 App. Div. 2d 520, 353 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1st Dep't).

190 34 N.Y.2d at 855, 316 N.E.2d at 350, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
19136 N.Y.2d 754, 329 N.E.2d 664, 368 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1975), dismissing appeal from 44

App. Div. 2d 681, 353 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1974).
19236 N.Y.2d at 754-55, 329 N.E.2d at 664, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
M See 20 N.Y.2d at 402, 230 N.E.2d at 230, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 490.

[Vol. 54:443

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

claimed in Lizza. 194

Lizza, however, is not the last word on the subject. In Ratka v.
St. Francis Hospital, 95 the plaintiff brought a negligence action
which asserted causes of action for conscious pain and suffering
and wrongful death. Two defendants asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the
affirmative defense, and the defendants cross-moved to dismiss the
wrongful death action. The appellate division order granted the
defendants' cross-motion, and the plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals retained jurisdiction on the ground that
the finally determined wrongful death cause of action was "materially separate and distinct" from the non-final conscious pain and
suffering cause of action. 96 The Ratka court took note of the
trend, evidenced in Sirlin, "away from earlier decisions limiting
the availability of the implied severance theory.'

97

At the same

time, the court expressly recognized that the doctrine may not be
applied "in instances characterized as 'some exceptional situations
involving an extremely close interrelationship between the respective claims.'"198 After reviewing the precedent, the Ratka court

concluded that "in cases involving an interrelationship or overlap
of claims, the separateness of the dismissed claim must be
determined."' 199
In measuring the claims involved in Ratka under the "separateness" standard, the court noted that recovery for conscious
pain and suffering accrues to the decedent's estate, while wrongful
death damages benefit the decedent's distributees. Since the claims
involved different legal theories and the recovery under each belonged to different parties, the claims were held to be separate and
therefore severable for finality purposes, even though "there is
some overlap" and even though the claims may arise from the
same factual transaction. 00 The court further stressed that the
19,Indeed, the Lizza court did not even cite Sirlin. Although the Lizza test of discreteness is seemingly a bit broader than the Behren "one cause of action" standard, it has been
suggested that Lizza is "perhaps somewhat inconsistent" with Sirlin and that the court may
have signalled a retreat from Sirlin in order to lighten its caseload. See 7 WK&M, supra
note 2, T 5611.03.
-9544 N.Y.2d 604, 378 N.E.2d 1027, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1978).
198 Id.
at 609, 378 N.E.2d at 1030, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
197

Id.

198 Id. (citing Sirlin and Behren).
199

Id.

200

Id.
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challenged affirmative defense of the statute of limitations applied
only to the wrongful death cause of action and not to the conscious
pain and suffering claim.201
Ratka thus reflects a practical application of the prior implied
severance precedents. If claims asserted in the pleadings are based
upon legally distinct theories and the issue on appeal relates only
to a finally determined claim, under Ratka, implied severance may
be in order, even though the final and non-final claims do not stem
from "discrete" transactions.
Analysis is further assisted by two recent cases. In one case,2 02
the plaintiff asserted three causes of action arising out of two contracts between the parties; the first for fraud and the second two
for breach of contract. Two causes of action were based upon the
parties' original contract; the other was based upon a subsequent
contract. The order of the appellate division granted the defendant
summary judgment on the first two causes of action but left the
third cause of action pending. The court of appeals refused to dismiss the appeal, since in accordance with Ratka, the two finally
determined causes of action "both present different legal issues
and arise out of transactions different from the third cause and
should be deemed impliedly severed."2 03 On the other hand, where
several causes of action arose out of the same alleged contract, the
court refused to "impliedly sever" a finally determined cause of
action from the causes of action still pending.20 4
The current tendency of the court of appeals appears to steer
a middle course between the liberality of Sirlin and the rigidity of
Lizza. The concept apparently will be applied where finally determined claims assert legal theories and involve legal issues distinct
or separate from the claims in the case that remain undetermined.
The separateness of the legal issues seemingly is more significant
than whether the claims stem from the same operative facts. If,
however, the claims are closely allied in theory and arise from the
same basic facts, implied severance is likely to be refused. As is
evident from this discussion, however, application of the concept of
Id. at 610, 378 N.E.2d at 1030, 407 N.Y.S 2d at 460.
Orange and Rockland Util., Inc. v. Howard Oil Co., 46 N.Y.2d 880, 387 N.E.2d 613,
414 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1979), aff'g 61 App. Div. 2d 781, 402 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1st Dep't 1978).
21

202

203

46 N.Y.2d at 882, 387 N.E.2d at 614, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 682.

20" Associated Coal Sales Corp. v. Hughes, 46 N.Y.2d 1071, 390 N.E.2d 301, 416
N.Y.S.2d 794 (1979), dismissing appeal from 64 App. Div. 2d 562, 406 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1st

Dep't 1978).
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implied severance greatly depended upon facts presented in particular cases.
Attempts to invoke the concept of implied severance in order
to appeal from arguably non-final orders may well increase the
number of motions to dismiss and the number of sua sponte dismissals that the court must act upon. A practical, but drastic, alternative-to eliminate the need for the court to pass upon the jurisdictional bases of such attempts might be a statutory
amendment that would eliminate the doctrine of implied severance
entirely by providing that if a portion of the order is non-final, the
entire order should be considered non-final. An appeal in such
cases could then be taken only with the permission of the appellate
division. Such a provision would reduce the number of cases and
"motions submitted to the court and would protect counsel from
the pitfalls inherent in the implied severance concept. Indeed, such
a procedure would treat partially final orders under the same rules
that permit appellants to take completely non-final orders to the
court of appeals with the permission of the appellate division.20 5
The elimination of the doctrine of implied severance by deeming all partially final orders to be non-final appears to be the only
constitutionally valid means of dealing with the issue. Once portions of a partially final order are considered "severed," and hence
final, the constitutional provisions for appeals as of right and for
appeals by permission of the court of appeals are triggered.20 6 Ad205

See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 5601(d), 5602(a)(1)(ii) (McKinney 1978).

But see Created Gemstones, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., motion for leave to appeal
granted in part, 45 N.Y.2d 959, 411 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978), appeal determined, 47 N.Y.2d
250, 391 N.E.2d 990, 417 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1979). In Created Gemstones, the court applied the
concept of implied severance to a case in which defendant had been granted summary judgment on counterclaims for breach of the same contract as he was sued upon by plaintiff.
Plaintiff had commenced an action in which it was alleged that defendant had breached a
distributorship arrangement by refusing to ship goods to plaintiff on credit. Defendant
counterclaimed for the balance due for prior deliveries and to recoup a small overcredit. The
lower courts granted defendant summary judgment on the counterclaims on the ground that
plaintiff's liability for goods previously shipped was clearly established.
This application of implied severance accords with the court's decision in Ratka v. St.
Francis Hosp., 44 N.Y.2d 604, 378 N.E.2d 1027, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1978), since, although the
claims arose from the same contract, different legal theories were involved. Further, the
transactions giving rise to the opposing claims in Created Gemstones appear to be different
since plaintiff complained of a failure to sell additional goods while defendant's counterclaims were based upon past sales.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the factual differences between Created Gemstones and
Associated Coal Sales Corp. v. Hughes, 46 N.Y.2d 1071, 390 N.E.2d 301, 416 N.Y.S.2d 794
(1979), appear to be slight. This further suggests that the availability of implied severance
may hinge upon minute factual distinctions and upon the attitude of the court prevailing at
20'
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ditionally, such an amendment could be analogous to the procedures now followed in the federal courts in similar cases.20 7
APPEAL OF FINAL AND NON-FINAL ORDERS

Having discussed the criteria for assessing whether an order is
final or non-final, we may now briefly highlight the avenue by
which both types of orders can be taken to the court of appeals.
The most frequently encountered methods for appealing final
orders are well-known. A final order of the appellate division can
be appealed as of right in a case originating in the supreme,
county, surrogate's, and family courts, the court of claims, or a
state administrative agency if: (1) there is a dissent on a question
of law in favor of the appellant; (2) the order reverses the order or
judgment made in the court or agency below; or (3) the order substantially modifies the determination below to the detriment of the
appellant, and the modification is reviewable by the court of
appeals. °8
A final order can be appealed as of right if the construction of
the state or federal constitutions is directly involved, 20 9 and a final
judgment of a court of record of original instance can be appealed
directly as of right if the only issue is the validity of a federal
or
210
state statute under either the state or federal constitutions.
An appeal as of right also may be taken from a final judgment
of a court of first instance or from the final determination of an
agency or from a final order of the appellate division, where, on a
prior appeal, the appellate division has made an order which necessarily affects the final judgment or determination, and the prior
order could have been appealed as of right except for the fact that
it was non-final.2 1
the time the appeal is pursued.
207

Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), provides

that where more than one claim for relief is involved, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third party claim, or where there are multiple parties involved, the district
court may direct the entry of judgment on fewer than all the claims or parties "upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay ... . Id. Such judgment can
then be appealed to the circuit court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). When the
appellate division allows an appeal from a non-final order, it is implicit in the grant of such
permission that there is "no just reason for delay" in the presentation of the appeals to the
court of appeals.
208

200

N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5601(a) (McKinney 1978).
Id. § 5601(b)(1).

:10 Id. § 5601(b)(2).
211 Id. § 5601(d). However, only the prior non-final order that is the predicate for the
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An order of the appellate division that grants a new trial or
that affirms the granting of a new trial can be appealed if the appellant stipulates that, should he lose the appeal, judgment absolute shall be rendered against him.2 12
A final order of the appellate division that cannot be appealed
as of right can be appealed with the permission of either the court
of appeals or the appellate division.2 13
Lastly, a final appellate division order or a final agency determination can be appealed with the permission of the court of appeals or the appellate division where, on a prior appeal, the appellate division has made an order which necessarily affects the final
judgment or determination and the prior order was not appealable
as of right.2 14
There are a limited number of circumstances under which a
non-final order can be appealed to the court of appeals. The two
encountered most frequently should be noted briefly. First, a nonfinal order of the appellate division can be appealed with the permission of either the court of appeals or the appellate division in
proceedings brought by or against one or more public officers, or a
public board or commission, or a court or tribunal, provided the
order does not grant or affirm the granting of a new trial. 1 Second, a non-final order of the appellate division can be appealed
with the permission of the appellate division, provided that the appellate division certifies that questions of law have arisen which
appeal can be reviewed. Gilroy v. American Broadcasting Co., 46 N.Y.2d 580, 389 N.E.2d
117, 415 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1979).
212 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5601(c) (McKinney 1978).
21 Id. § 5602(a)(1)(i).
21.Id. § 5602(a)(1)(ii).
225 Id.
§ 5602(a)(2). This section was designed to relieve agencies from the difficulty
confronted when the appellate division annuls a determination and remands the case for
further proceedings. See F.J. Zeronda, Inc. v. Town Board of Halfmoon, 37 N.Y.2d 198, 200,
333 N.E.2d 154, 155, 371 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1975)(per curiam). Prior to the enactment of
the amendment, the agency could not appeal such an order because it was not final, nor
could it appeal from its own determination made upon remand. After 1944 and prior to the
1952 enactment of the predecessor of CPLR 5602(a)(2), the agency's only option was either
to stipulate to judgment absolute or forego the appeal. Id. at 200, 333 N.E.2d at 155, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 874.
The court of appeals has held that a municipality and its governing board fits within
CPLR 5602(a)(2) only if it was acting in an adjudicatory capacity. Id. at 201, 333 N.E.2d at
156, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 875. But cf., James v. Board of Educ., 42 N.Y.2d 357, 366 N.E.2d 1291,
397 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1977) (court accepted jurisdiction to review order of injunction issued
against school board's administration of examination without discussion of whether decision
to administer test was "adjudicatory" in nature).
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RULE OF FINALITY

ought to be reviewed by the court of appeals.2 1
CONCLUSION

Finality is a complex subject. Its many avenues are replete
with pitfalls to be avoided and roadblocks to be overcome in order
to obtain a ruling from the court of appeals on the merits of the
litigation. Persisting issues of controversy include the direct appeal
of orders made on within-an-action motions to compel arbitration
and the problem of implied severance. As to the former, the court,
in its most recent decision, appears to have held that rulings made
on within-an-action motions to compel arbitration are final. On the
issue of implied severance, it is submitted that a legislative abrogation of the concept may serve to eliminate the uncertainty inherent
in it, while reducing the caseload of the court of appeals by eliminating appeals from orders which are only partially final. Such appeals may be properly taken at a time when the action has been
finally determined.
This article has sought to discuss the policies which underlie
the finality concept and to highlight frequently encountered

216

N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 5602 (b)(1), 5713 (McKinney 1978). The question of law

certified by the appellate division must be decisive of the correctness of the appellate division's determination. If the decision could turn on the exercise of discretion, the question of
law is not decisive and the appeal will be dismissed. See, e.g., Stellema v. Vantage Press,
Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 882, 392 N.E.2d 1258, 419 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1979) (appeal on certified question
from grant of class action certification dismissed); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Irving, 41
N.Y.2d 829, 361 N.E.2d 1040, 393 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1977) (modification of preliminary injunction could turn on discretion so appeal dismissed); Patrician Plastic Corp. v. Bernadel Realty Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 599, 256 N.E.2d 180, 307 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1970) (question of law on
issuance of supplemental summons held decisive); but see Barasch v. Micucci, N.Y.L.J.,
April 1, 1980, at 4, col. 1, which involved an appeal on a certified question from denial of
motion to dismiss complaint for failure to prosecute. The court held that, while decisions on
such motions are discretionary, "the possibility that the lower court's discretion was abused
does give rise to a question of law cognizable in this Court." Id. Thus the certified question
was held "decisive."
If the appellate division has indicated that its discretion would be exercised in favor of
the appellant, the question of law would then be decisive, and jurisdiction will be retained
by the court of appeals. See Kritchmar v. Kritchmar, 42 N.Y.2d 858, 366 N.E.2d 863, 397
N.Y.S.2d 775 (1977). In Kritchmar, the appellants sought to amend their answer to add a
defense. In retaining jurisdiction, the court of appeals reasoned that since the appellate division and the lower court allowed the answer to be amended in other respects, "it may reasonably be concluded that the courts below would have permitted the amendment, in discretion, had they believed the defense available as a matter of law." Id. at 860, 366 N.E.2d
at 865, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 776-77.
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problems. With an understanding of the fundamental purposes of
the finality rule, practitioners may stand on firmer footing in traversing the finality morass.

